Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2011

Personal Beliefs and Public Print: The Influence of Pre-Existing
Attitudes and Pretrial Publicity Information on Final Verdicts
Sara Marie Locatelli
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Locatelli, Sara Marie, "Personal Beliefs and Public Print: The Influence of Pre-Existing Attitudes and
Pretrial Publicity Information on Final Verdicts" (2011). Dissertations. 248.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/248

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2011 Sara Marie Locatelli

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

PERSONAL BELIEFS AND PUBLIC PRINT:
THE INFLUENCE OF PRE-EXISTING ATTITUDES AND
PRETRIAL PUBLICITY INFORMATION ON FINAL VERDICTS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY
SARA MARIE LOCATELLI
CHICAGO, IL
AUGUST 2011

Copyright by Sara Marie Locatelli, 2011
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are many people who helped to make this dissertation possible. While
naming everyone would produce acknowledgements longer than this whole dissertation, I
will do my best to include everyone in some way. First, I would like to thank my parents,
who instilled in me a love for learning and the drive necessary to reach my goals. You
answered every question I asked (and I am sure there were many), and supported me in
every decision I have made. You always told me how proud you were of me; I hope to
continue to make you proud. Thank you also to my extended family, for always being
loving and understanding, even when I was too busy (or poor) to come visit. I look
forward to spending more time with all of you soon!
To my psychology professors at Baker University, thank you for showing me that
I love psychology research, and giving me the knowledge I needed to make it this far.
Your guidance and teaching continue to influence me even today, and showed me that,
despite any limitations I experienced in the past, I really can do math! I would also like
to thank the faculty and staff at Loyola University Chicago, for the support of a
scholarship and assistantship when I first began graduate studies, a teaching fellowship,
and a top-notch education.
Thank you to my co-workers and superiors at Hines VA Hospital. It has been a
pleasure to work with all of you. You have taught me so much about health research and
implementation science, and opened my eyes to a new area of research and career
iii

opportunity. You reminded me how much I love research. I look forward to working
with all of you in the future, I hope as a colleague.
A special thanks to the members of my dissertation committee. To Linda Heath,
my dissertation director, thank you for having faith in me throughout my time at Loyola,
and for your constant support and friendship. To Scott Tindale, it has been an honor to
work with you and learn from you; no matter how busy you were, your door was always
open. To John Edwards, for his kindness, his humor, and always knowing the right thing
to say. And to Toby Dye, for his thoughtful feedback and inspiring love of research.
Thank you also to my research assistant, Mary Maraventano, for her enthusiasm and
dedication! Finally, thank you to Fred Bryant for teaching me how to conduct power
analysis with the PASS program, for answering my questions along the way, and for
reminding me that I can do anything if I put my mind to it.
Thank you to all my wonderful friends, through Baker, Loyola, and the Apollo
Chorus of Chicago. You have no idea how much your friendship has meant to me.
Thank you for parties (even “painting parties”), movies, trips to Milwaukee, greasy pizza
and beer-of-the-month, listening to me vent about grad school, snow angels and S’Mores,
and too many other fun times to name. Thank you for continuing to remind me that what
I do actually matters!
And finally, thank you to Tony, my wonderful husband. You saved the day (and
my data!) more times than I can count. Your love and support has kept me going, no
matter how hard things felt.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iii

LIST OF TABLES

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

x

ABSTRACT

xi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Pretrial Publicity
Non-Experimental Studies of PTP Effects
Experimental Studies of PTP Effects
Methodological Issues with Studying PTP
Meta-Analysis on PTP
Using Remedies to Alleviate PTP
Legal Attitudes
Theories Explaining or Predicting These Effects

6
6
7
11
18
22
24
27
29

CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

35

CHAPTER FOUR: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
Power Analysis

39
43

CHAPTER FIVE: PILOT TESTING
Pilot 1 Methods
Participants
Materials
Trial transcripts
Posttest
Procedure
Pilot 1 Results
Verdicts
Emotional Reactions
Pilot 1 Discussion
Pilot 2 Methods
Participants
Materials
Trial transcripts
Posttest
Procedure
Pilot 2 Results

45
46
46
46
46
47
48
48
48
50
51
52
52
53
53
53
53
53
v

Verdicts
Emotional Reactions
Pilot 2 Discussion

53
53
54

CHAPTER SIX: METHODS
Participants
Materials
News Article
Questionnaire
Trial Transcript
Jury Instructions
Posttest
Procedure

55
55
56
56
56
57
57
57
58

CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS
Regression Analyses on Guilt
Confession
Resisting Arrest
Prior Record
Logistic Regression Analyses on Verdict
Confession
Resisting Arrest
Prior Record
Overall Results
Exploratory Analyses

59
62
63
65
68
73
73
75
76
77
78

CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION
Study Limitations

84
90

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS AND GOING FORWARD
Why Knowledge is Not Enough
Background on Implementation Science
Bridging the Gap
Working Together to Move Forward

97
97
102
109
109

APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF WITNESS CHARACTERISTIC EFFECTS

111

APPENDIX B: PILOT TESTING CONSENT SCRIPT

114

APPENDIX C: PILOT TESTING DEBRIEFING

116

APPENDIX D: COMPLETE LOGISTIC REGRESSION TABLE

118

APPENDIX E: NEWS ARTICLE

120
vi

APPENDIX F: VOIR DIRE QUESTIONNAIRE

122

APPENDIX G: TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

128

APPENDIX H: JURY INSTRUCTIONS

144

APPENDIX I: POSTTEST

147

APPENDIX J: CONSENT SCRIPT

149

APPENDIX K: DEBRIEFING

151

REFERENCES

153

VITA

164

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Variables and Interactions Used to Test Hypotheses

40

2. Conviction Rates by Trial Version, Victim, and Study Location

49

3. Overall Effects of Location, Version, and Victim on Verdicts

50

4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of Affect by Condition

54

5. Sample Demographic Information

55

6. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables and Interaction Terms

60

7. Correlations between Predictors and Outcome Variables

61

8. Predicting Guilt Rating with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions

62

9. Predicting Guilt Rating with Confession PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

64

10. Predicting Guilt Rating with Resisting Arrest PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

67

11. Predicting Guilt Rating with Prior Record PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

69

12. Predicting Verdict with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions

73

13. Predicting Verdict with Confession PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

74

14. Predicting Verdict with Resisting Arrest PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

75

15. Predicting Verdict with Prior Record PTP, Attitude, and Instructions

76

16. Chart of Hypothesized Effects and Significant Results

78

17. Regressions Using Evidence, Police Behavior, and Suspect Behavior Attitudes 80
18. Frequencies (and Percentages) of Guilt Rating by Verdict
viii

81

19. Predicting Guilt with Criminal Justice Attitudes

ix

82

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude

36

2. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard)

37

3. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific)

37

4. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong)

38

5. Effect of Confession PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean)

65

6. Effect of Resisting Arrest PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean)

68

7. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard)

71

8. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific)

72

9. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong)

72

10. Effect of Guilt Rating and Reasonable Doubt Attitude

83

x

ABSTRACT
Pretrial publicity (PTP), defined as any news story about a case not yet in trial,
has been shown to affect trial outcomes. Results, however, are mixed, with studies
finding strong effects, others weaker effects, and some no effects. These differences are
sometimes attributed to methodology and study stimuli. In the present research, the
effect of participant attitudes was explored. Participant attitudes can have a strong
influence on perceptions about a piece of information, and could explain differences in
use of PTP as well as findings that judicial remedies to alleviate PTP effects are
ineffective. Participants were exposed to one of four news articles, containing
information on confession, prior record, or resisting arrest, or only neutral information.
They took a measure of legal attitudes, including questions relevant to the negative PTP
information received, and then read a trial transcript of an assault on a middle-aged man.
Participants then received standard jury instructions, a specific admonition to ignore PTP,
or a specific admonition with the additional statement that PTP can be unreliable.
Results differed by content of PTP. Participants receiving confession PTP
assigned higher guilt ratings overall; strong instructions increased guilt ratings and guilty
verdicts among participants receiving confession PTP. Participants receiving resisting
arrest PTP and specific instructions assigned higher guilt ratings than participants
receiving neutral PTP and specific instructions. Finally, among participants receiving
prior record PTP, a weak attitude toward a prior record as indicative of guilt and standard
xi

instructions resulted in lower guilt ratings than participants receiving neutral PTP; the
effects were reversed for participants with a strong attitude that having a prior record
indicates guilt. Stronger instructions weakened the effects of attitude and PTP. Results
suggest that instructions specifically addressing PTP information may only ameliorate
PTP effects in certain situations, and that psychological reactance, thought suppression
and ironic processes provide better explanations for use of PTP, despite instructions to
discourage use, than belief perseverance. Additionally, the effects of other attitudes
specific to the case and the relationship between guilt ratings and verdicts were explored.
Future research should continue to explore relationship among attitudes, evidence, PTP,
and outcomes.

xii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The study of social psychology began as a study of attitudes (McGuire, 1989).
Though this subfield has expanded to include a variety of important research topics,
including the ways in which psychological processes can influence legal cases, attitudes
remain an important aspect of many social psychological inquiries (Ottati, Edwards, &
Krumdick, 2005). The present project seeks to expand on past research, by examining
the effect of attitudes on processing of legal information; reactions to and influences of
pretrial publicity may depend in part on an individual’s attitudes about the legal
information contained in the media. These attributes can influence an individual’s
behavior in this legal context, the most important behavior being the individual’s verdict
preference. These issues have never been studied empirically, so the current research
project will study these variables.
Though the eventual verdict from a deliberating jury is the only aspect that
concerns the legal system, social psychological research has shown that individual verdict
preferences can have a strong influence on eventual verdict, even if not all jurors are in
total agreement at the beginning of deliberation. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) for instance
found that the majority verdict at the beginning of deliberation was the final verdict in
over 90% of trials, a finding that has been confirmed by both experimental and field
studies (for a review, see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001). Where
1

individual jurors start out is a good indication of where the entire jury will end. Any
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information that may bias jurors individually before they step into the jury room, then, is
of great concern.
One issue that can bias jurors before they enter the jury room, or even the
courtroom, is pretrial publicity (PTP). One of the first instances of PTP was the Aaron
Burr treason trial in 1807 (United States v. Burr, 1807). Burr argued that an impartial
jury could not be seated due to the prejudicial stories published by a local newspaper.
This was the first time the court had dealt with these issues, and with no research or
precedent to guide them, determined that knowledge of a case does not exempt a
potential juror. It must be shown that the juror is biased against the defendant and that
this bias would prevent the juror from being able to decide the case based on the
evidence. Though PTP has come before the court many times since then, the “actual
bias” ruling has rarely changed (Curtner & Kassier, 2005).
The issue of PTP is in the middle of a tug-of-war between two Constitutional
rights: the right to a free press and the right of defendants to a fair trial – which is why
PTP is often referred to as the free press-fair trial debate. Neither of these rights is
qualified in any way, though some (e.g. Chesterman, 1997) have argued that the First
Amendment is given greater weight than the Sixth; there is nothing in the Constitution
stating that the freedom of the press can be suspended in certain cases, leading many to
argue that censorship of the press is unconstitutional, regardless of the motive.
Therefore, those involved with the legal system are called to maintain a defendant’s 6th

amendment rights despite the freedom of the press to print information about the
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defendant.
Once a jury has been seated, they are asked by the court to avoid any press
coverage of the trial, and judges can make it more difficult for jurors to obtain
information from the media during the trial by using such options as sequestering the jury
or gag orders. But jurors do not enter the courtroom as blank slates; if the biasing
information has already been acquired by an individual before he or she becomes a juror,
these options are not likely to have any noticeable effect. The court has dealt with this
issue in a variety of ways. One way is with judicial remedies (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll,
1990). The court may delay a trial to allow the publicity to subside, which is referred to
as a continuance. The danger, however, is that the media will simply resume coverage
once the trial begins. Further, certain types of publicity, such as emotionally arousing
information, may be less easily forgotten than more factual PTP (Honess, Charman, &
Levi, 2003; Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990).
Once the jury pool (known as the venire) has been drawn, prospective jurors are
asked various questions, including questions about their knowledge of and beliefs about a
case, which is called voir dire. Often, voir dire is done in groups, in which the judge asks
general questions, such as, “Has anyone heard anything about this case?” and jurors
respond with yes or no (Hans & Dee, 1991). When the pretrial publicity associated with
a case is great, the court can elect to question each juror individually and even separately
from the rest of the jury pool. Obviously, this procedure is more time-consuming, and
would not be part of the regular questioning procedure. The court may also instruct

jurors to ignore any pretrial information they have obtained when deciding a case,
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referred to as a judicial admonition (Thompson & Fuqua, 1998). Many researchers and
theorists question whether jurors are able to ignore such information (Diamond &
Vidmar, 2001).
If PTP is so great that it is reasonable to assume an unbiased jury cannot be
seated, the court may draw a jury pool from another community – referred to as a
“change of venire” – and bring them to the jurisdiction in which the crime took place
(Studebaker & Penrod, 2005). Another option is to move the trial to another location and
carry out jury selection there, which is called a “change of venue.” This means that,
rather than moving the jurors, the judge, attorneys, and defendant must go to the different
jurisdiction instead. Either of these options is expensive and, therefore, rarely used. The
judge may also be hesitant to move a trial because of strong community reactions to the
crime and a desire to try to a case in the community (Moran & Cutler, 1991). For
example, Finkel (1995) discusses the Rodney King trial, which was moved to another
venue, and the police officers accused of assaulting King were acquitted; this relocation
led to riots and vocal critics, who believed that moving the trial to a predominantly White
community had been a miscarriage of justice. Well-known cases like this one can
influence other judges’ willingness to grant change of venue motions because of fear of
community reaction (Finkel, 1995).
The research examining continuance, voir dire, and judicial admonitions have not
always found strong conclusions, though Studebaker and Penrod (1997) argue that our
lack of complete understanding of PTP effects may make it difficult to uncover remedies

that will actually have an effect. If the remedies do not work, the final option is to
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overturn a verdict. The court has only exercised this option a few times (e.g., Irvin v.
Dowd, 1961; Rideau v. Louisiana, 1963; Shepherd v. Maxwell, 1966). In such cases, the
amount of PTP has been extreme and the information highly inflammatory. Some
research suggests, however, that PTP does not need to reach the level seen in these cases
to be biasing to jurors.
Legal psychologists have examined the issue of PTP from many angles. Two of
the most important aspects of this research are 1) how to determine whether a prospective
juror has been biased so that he or she may be excused from service and 2) how to use
remedies effectively so that, if any biased jurors were identified, the right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury may be ensured. The goal of this project is to examine these two issues,
by comparing individuals receiving biasing information in PTP to individuals receiving
control information, and by comparing levels of judicial admonishment. In addition, the
present research will measure and integrate participants’ attitudes toward certain pieces
of legal information to determine if and how these attitudes affect verdicts and
effectiveness of admonitions. Attitudes have been examined before in the PTP research
(e.g. Arbuthnot, Myers, & Leach, 2002; Butler, 2007; Chrzanowski, 2006; Constantini &
King, 1980/1981; De Luca, 1979; Kovera, 2002), with often mixed results, but the
present research will expand on prior attitude research by measuring the effect of specific
attitudes instead of general attitude toward crime, which, according to theory on attitudebehavior correspondence (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Ronis, Yates, & Kirscht, 1989), should
have a stronger relationship to verdict preferences.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before discussing the present research, it is necessary to examine what has been
found in the past. First, the findings of research on PTP will be summarized and
discussed, including research that has examined the use of one or more remedies, along
with commentary on the methodology utilized in these studies. Next, research and theory
on attitudes will be reviewed.
Pretrial Publicity
PTP became a topic of research in the 1960s, shortly after the American Bar
Foundation (ABA) released recommendations for what information law enforcement and
court personnel should not give to the press. The most recent guidelines (ABA, 1991)
included information on a confession or similar statement, results of tests, opinions on
guilt, information on defendant’s character, and information on prior arrests or
convictions. A handful of researchers have performed content analyses of the media to
determine whether these guidelines have been followed and what type of information is
actually being included in PTP, as well as to provide estimates of how many stories a
given defendant receives. Often, such content analyses are performed as part of a change
of venue motion (e.g. Moran & Cutler 1991, 1997; Studebaker, Robbenolt, PathakSharma, & Penrod, 2000) or as part of an experimental study using a certain trial (e.g.,
Chrzanowski, 2006), meaning these analyses examine only one case. Other content
6

analyses have examined the media in general, and have found that PTP is predominantly
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pro-prosecution and the recommendations of the ABA are routinely violated (Imrich,
Mullin, & Linz, 1995). Further, certain defendants, such as racial minorities, may be the
subject of more negative PTP (Dixon & Linz, 2002).
Bruschke and Loges (1999) examined all federal first-degree murder trials in a 2year period and found that approximately 46% of the cases received no publicity. The
remaining cases varied in the amount of PTP received, ranging from cases covered in one
article to one case that received 141 articles. The more sensational the crime, the more
publicity it will receive. For instance, Studebaker, Robbennolt, Pathak-Sharma, and
Penrod (2000) content-analyzed over 1500 articles for the Timothy McVeigh trial; these
articles were randomly selected from specific venue locations, meaning that this number
does not represent the entire population of articles on this case.
Non-Experimental Studies of PTP Effects
Obviously, PTP does not occur in all cases, but it does occur in a sizeable
proportion of cases, and, because it is very likely to be negative toward the defendant, it
is a cause for concern. Various researchers have studied the effect of naturally occurring
PTP on the tendency to prejudge guilt-innocence, as well as a variety of other variables,
such as sentencing preference and the ability to be impartial. Some were performed as
part of a motion for a change of venue, while others were performed to examine a new
methodology in performing public opinion surveys. These studies provide information
on how PTP affects verdict preferences pretrial.

Though these studies differ in how PTP exposure is operationalized, PTP
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exposure does appear to affect beliefs about guilt, especially pretrial. Nietzel and
Dillehay (1983) presented the results of 5 community surveys, four of which compared
respondents in the trials’ current venues (where PTP exposure was high) to one or more
alternative venues. Results in general show that respondents from the venue counties,
where PTP tends to be greater, were more likely to have heard about the cases, read
stories about the cases, and believe the defendants were guilty than respondents from
other counties. Vidmar and Judson (1981) and Moran and Cutler (1991, 1997), on the
other hand, operationalized PTP exposure by whether a respondent was aware of a case,
and found that respondents who had heard about a case were more likely to believe the
defendant was guilty.
Other researchers have tested respondents’ knowledge of the case, and examined
guilt based on specific pieces of content remembered (Chrzanowski, 2006), categorized
participants by level of knowledge (Constantini & King, 1980/1981; Simon &
Eimermann, 1971), or correlated number of correct responses with guilt (Arbuthnot,
Myers, & Leach, 2002; Studebaker, Robbennolt, Penrod, Pathak-Sharma, Groscup, &
Devenport, 2002). Regardless of how knowledge was measured, it was found to relate to
belief in guilt; respondents who were more knowledgeable were more likely to believe
the defendant was guilty.
These surveys show that respondents who are knowledgeable about the trial are
more likely to prejudge, though there are some exceptions. Brown, Duane, and Fraser
(1997) found that respondents with increased exposure to O.J. Simpson through the

media were more likely to believe Simpson was innocent, though this was because
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participants with increased exposure tended to form a parasocial relationship, a
psychological connection people may develop with celebrities, with Simpson.
Obviously, when the defendant is a celebrity, PTP may have different effects on potential
jurors and may even create sympathy for the defendant.
Some studies have used naturally occurring PTP, and then presented participants
with trial information. Freedman and Burke (1996) measured knowledge of the case, and
then gave participants a brief summary. Because the case had not yet come to trial, the
researchers created the trial summary based on similar cases. Though knowledgeable
participants believed, pretrial, that the defendant was guilty, this effect went away after
reading the summary. Participants were informed that this trial information was
fabricated and that the researchers did not have inside information on the trial; the trial
information was also very weak, yielding approximately a 31 percent conviction rate
overall.
Honess, Charman, and Levi (2003) also studied naturally occurring PTP in a fraud
case in England. Participants reported what they could remember about the case, and
their responses were classified as being either emotional (such as information on the
effect the crime had on the victims) or factual (such as the amount of money involved)
PTP. Over a period of days, participants viewed a six-hour video re-enactment and
provided their thoughts and verdict preferences throughout. At the end of the trial,
participants rendered a final verdict and evaluated the evidence. Results showed an effect
for emotional PTP, but not for factual PTP; participants who had recalled emotional

information pretrial were more likely to render a guilty verdict. In addition,
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participants’ reasoning about the trial was found to mediate the effect of PTP on verdict.
The PTP had affected the way they considered the evidence throughout the trial, which in
turn, influenced their verdict.
In another examination of naturally occurring PTP, Chrzanowski (2006)
conducted an internet study in which she measured the effect of naturally occurring PTP
on pretrial, midtrial, and post-trial verdicts in an acquaintance rape trial and found an
effect for PTP. Participants completed a questionnaire of what they remembered from
PTP, then over a period of months, completed guilt ratings and evaluations of various
pieces of evidence after each trial summary. Participants who reported viewing proprosecution PTP, which was coded based on what information they recalled from the
media, rated the defendants as significantly more guilty throughout the trial than
participants who had recalled neutral or pro-defense PTP information. Participants who
had recalled pro-defense PTP, on the other hand, rated the defendant as significantly less
guilty. Pro-defense PTP, however, is far less common than pro-prosecution PTP.
One study examined the effect of naturally occurring PTP by accident. While
studying the effect of eyewitness testimony in a trial summary, Greene and Loftus (1984)
suddenly saw a drop in conviction rates. On the debriefing questionnaires, many
participants mentioned that they had acquitted the defendant because of a recent case in
the media (the Titus case) in which a man had been released after it was established that
the victim in his trial had been mistaken in identifying him as the perpetrator. This study
was one of the first to examine general PTP – media information on crime in general or

on a different trial that influences verdicts in the target trial. In a second study, Greene
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and Loftus recruited a community sample, asking if they had heard about another case
involving a mistaken eyewitness, and measured their verdict preference in the case from
their first study. Once again, participants who had heard about the case of mistaken
identification were less likely to convict.
While these results from non-experimental research on PTP are mixed, they
generally show that PTP biases participants, even after exposure to trial information.
Such research, however, does not allow control over other aspects that may affect trial
outcome, such as facts of the case, characteristics of the parties involved, timing of the
PTP, and contents of the PTP. Such research also does not clearly show why trial
information counteracts the effects of PTP in some cases, but not others. Therefore, in
addition to the study of naturally occurring PTP, many researchers have performed
experiments in which they manipulate the presence of PTP and measure the effects on
verdicts and guilt ratings.
Experimental Studies of PTP Effects
Though there are many contradictory findings in the experimental PTP literature,
there are some factors that have been demonstrated to affect study outcome. One
commonly studied factor is the type of information presented in PTP. The ABA
guidelines included a variety of information that should not be published in PTP, and
content analyses (Dixon & Linz, 2002; Grady, 1972; Imrich, Mullin, & Linz, 1995) have
shown that PTP can include many difference pieces of information - from hearsay to

prior convictions to confession information. Research suggests that the content of PTP
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may have an effect on guilt.
Two of the most biasing pieces of information, a confession and prior convictions,
are often ruled inadmissible in court; the former is ruled inadmissible if it was coerced,
and the latter is generally not allowed in court except when the defendant testifies. De
Luca (1979) compared several news stories, to determine how different pieces of
information affected perceptions of guilt. Participants who read about a confession,
either alone or in combination with information on prior arrest and/or failure of a lie
detector test, were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty of embezzlement than
control participants. Unfortunately, he did not include conditions in which prior
convictions or performance on a lie detector test were presented alone, so it is difficult to
tell specifically what information biased participants.
Padawer-Singer and Barton (1975) conducted two studies, with the cooperation of
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, on the negative effects of confession and
prior record information, using deliberating juries. Participants were randomly selected
from the court’s jury pools and were assigned to 12-person juries. Half of the juries
received a news story stating that the defendant had a prior record and had confessed to
the crime. Participants met in a courtroom, where they listened to a recording of a trial,
then deliberated to a verdict. The first experiment ended with many hung juries, but
individual jurors who had received PTP were more likely to vote guilty. In the second
experiment, more time was given for deliberation, meaning there were fewer hung juries,
especially among exposed jurors. Juries receiving negative PTP were more likely to

convict. Once again, because prior record and confession were always presented
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together, it cannot be ascertained whether one is more biasing than the other, or what
effect each piece of information would have alone. However, this study does support the
contention that such information is biasing to juries. Tans and Chaffee (1966) also
compared different pieces of favorable or unfavorable information, and examined the
effect confession alone or when combined with other information. Once again,
information on a confession increased perceptions of guilt, especially when this
information was presented alone.
Prior record alone is also believed to be very biasing to jurors. Otto, Penrod, and
Dexter (1994) examined prior record, along with other biasing pieces of information:
negative statements on the defendant’s character, information on the defendant’s low
status job, and strong or weak inadmissible statements from the defendant’s neighbor.
Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of these pieces of information,
rendered a pretrial verdict, viewed a videotaped trial, and completed a measure of verdict
and perceptions of the defendant. Character information and inadmissible statements
were found to influence pretrial verdicts, which, in turn, influenced final verdicts.
Character information and strong statements biased the participants toward guilt, while
weak statements had the opposite effect. In addition, prior record affected final verdict
indirectly; knowledge of a prior record made participants more likely to view the
defendant as a “typical criminal” which led to more guilty verdicts.
Placement of the information did not have an effect. Hvistendahl (1979) also
studied prior arrest, as well as other negative information, examining whether placement

moderated the effect of PTP on verdict. Participants were randomly assigned to
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receive control information, prior arrest, gang membership, or defendant race. He found
that prejudicial information presented in the last paragraph was just as biasing as
prejudicial information presented in the lead paragraph, and participants who had
received information on prior arrest or gang membership were more likely to believe the
defendant was guilty than participants receiving control or race information.
In addition, though not part of the ABA’s guidelines, some researchers have
examined the effect of reports on evidence, such as witness information or physical
evidence to be used in trial. Even if the participants eventually hear the evidence in trial,
such information presented in PTP can be one-sided. Shaw and Skolnick (2004)
compared PTP containing witness testimony information to PTP summarizing physical
evidence, and found that participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty in the
physical PTP condition. This effect was only significant, however, after participants had
deliberated. Burke (2000) also examined reports on evidence. Participants then viewed a
trial and deliberated in groups of 4 to 7. After deliberation, participants rendered
individual verdicts. Only participants receiving eyewitness information in PTP rendered
any guilty verdicts; all other participants found the defendant not guilty.
Another way content has been studied is by classifying PTP as emotional or
factual in nature. Kramer and Kerr (1989) compared participants receiving control
information, factual information (prior convictions and inadmissible physical evidence),
emotional information (a hit-and-run charge), or both factual and emotional information
in PTP. Participants receiving any biasing information were more likely to convict. It

was argued, however, that emotional information may be more memorable and that
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emotional PTP may still have an effect on verdicts after a delay.
To study this possibility, Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) performed an elaborate
study using the same case and stimuli as Kramer and Kerr (1989). Some participants saw
the case immediately after seeing PTP, while others saw the case after a delay. In
addition, some participants were allowed to deliberate. The majority of participants were
jury-eligible community members, with a few student participants included only in
sessions without enough participants to create complete juries. They found that, while a
delay reduced the number of guilty verdicts among participants receiving factual PTP, it
had no effect on participants receiving emotional PTP, who were more likely to find the
defendant guilty than participants not receiving emotional PTP. They also found that
PTP effects were stronger for jurors allowed to deliberate than for participants asked to
decide the case alone.
Another factor that may affect study outcome is type of media. Many researchers
use newspaper stimuli, but some research (e.g., Rollings & Blascovich, 1977) suggests
that PTP viewed in other media, such as on TV, may have different effects. Ogloff and
Vidmar (1994) compared control participants to participants receiving newspaper only,
video only, or both newspaper and video, to determine if media had an influence on study
outcome. Participants receiving any media were more likely to believe the defendant was
guilty than control participants. The media groups did not significantly differ, but the
authors argued that the results showed a definite trend over all dependent variables, and
that this trend was in the hypothesized direction: belief in guilt and preferred sentence

were highest in the video and newspaper condition, and lowest in the newspaper only
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condition.
Deliberation has also been identified as a factor that can affect study outcomes
(Bruschke & Loges, 2004). A handful of studies, including a few of the studies discussed
previously, included deliberation, with some finding that deliberation reduced the effect
of PTP (e.g., Burke, 2000), and with others finding no effect (e.g., Padawer-Singer &
Barton, 1975) or even an increased effect of PTP (e.g., Davis, 1986; Dexter, Cutler, &
Moran, 1992; Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; Ruva, 2006; Shaw & Skolnick, 2004).
These mixed results have led some researchers to examine possible explanations. One
explanation for the mixed effects of deliberation is source-monitoring. It has been argued
that PTP has an influence on post-deliberation verdicts because jurors forget where the
information came from, and believe the PTP information was actually presented in trial
evidence. Ruva, McEvoy, and Bryant (2007) compared participants receiving PTP or
unrelated news stories who either deliberated or individually listed as many trial facts as
they could remember. Participants exposed to PTP were more likely to find the
defendant guilty than participants who read unrelated stories; deliberating jurors were
less likely to find the defendant guilty than non-deliberating jurors, but deliberation did
not interact with PTP. Even after deliberating, exposed jurors were more likely to vote
guilty than non-exposed jurors. Ruva et al. also found that after deliberation, exposed
jurors were more likely to mistake PTP for trial evidence. Non-deliberating jurors did
not make such source-monitoring errors.

Another explanation is case strength. Kerr, Niedermeier, and Kaplan (1999)
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compared jurors receiving negative PTP to jurors receiving positive PTP after reading
either a moderate-strength case or a weak case. They found that participants receiving
negative PTP and those reading a moderate-strength case were more likely to find the
defendant guilty, but found no interaction between PTP and case strength. In addition,
jurors who deliberated were less likely to find the defendant guilty than non-deliberating
jurors in the weak case, but when reading the moderate case, deliberating jurors were
more likely to find the defendant guilty. Essentially, studies that use moderate-strength
cases should be more likely to find increased PTP effects after deliberation than studies
using weaker evidence or studies that do not allow deliberation.
Strength of the evidence has been examined in other PTP studies, as well. In fact,
some researchers (e.g., Dexter, Cutler, & Moran, 1992; Fein, Morgan, Norton, &
Sommers, 1997; Riedel, 1993; Ruva et al., 2007; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008) have noted that
a moderate-strength case was specifically chosen for their research, because PTP is more
likely to have an influence. This is based on the liberation hypothesis (Kalven & Zeisel,
1966), which states that jurors will decide a case based on the evidence in strong and
weak cases, but will be more likely to use outside information when case strength is
moderate.
A recent field study (Devine, Buddenbaum, Houp, Studebaker, & Stolle, 2009)
examined the liberation hypothesis in real cases. The study was conducted using court
cases from courts in Indiana. Data on strength of the evidence and extraevidentiary
variables (such as PTP) were gathered through questionnaires from judges and attorneys,

and final verdicts were measured with questionnaires from jurors. The authors
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analyzed the moderating effect of strength of the evidence in two ways. First, they
correlated extraevidentiary variables with verdict while partialling out variance due to
strength of the evidence. Second, they divided cases into weak, moderate, and strong
evidence, and separately conducted correlations between extraevidentiary variables and
verdict at each level of evidence strength. PTP still had a significant effect on verdict
even after controlling for evidence strength, but when cases were classified as weak,
moderate, or strong, PTP only had a significant effect on verdict for moderate cases.
Methodological Issues with Studying PTP
Several researchers (Bruschke & Loges, 2004; Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, &
Jimenz-Lorente, 1999; Wilson & Bornstein, 1998) have noted that the method used to
study PTP effects may influence the outcome. Though people tend to evaluate targets in
terms of good-bad naturally, perhaps even automatically (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999), it
appears that when someone is being asked to perform this process as a juror, the outcome
may be different from a person who has been asked to do something else. The role
people are asked to play in a study can affect how they evaluate their target, the
defendant (Freedman, Martin, & Mota, 1998). For instance, in Frame’s (2001) study,
participants told to evaluate the defendant were more likely to evaluate the defendant
negatively than participants asked to read and evaluate the comprehensibility of the trial
transcript. It is unclear, however, whether the different outcome is because the
participant employed a different process when being asked to serve as a juror versus
being asked to evaluate the comprehensibility of the transcript, or whether being asked to

evaluate something else utilized cognitive resources that would have otherwise been

19

used to evaluate the defendant. In any case, the instructions given, whether serving as a
cover story or simply to create a control condition, can have profound effects on the study
outcome.
A study by Simon (1966) also shows the effect of instructions. Simon compared
news stories written in different styles. Participants received negative PTP written in a
conservative style or a sensational, tabloid style. Those who read the sensational article
were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty than participants reading the
conservative article. The effect went away, however, after hearing the trial and being
admonished by the judge to ignore PTP information. Some (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000)
question whether these findings are due to demand characteristics; participants were
recruited for a study on the “problem of trial publicity” (p. 41). In addition, all
participants received the same information pretrial, so comparisons could not be made to
participants who received no information; though trial information reduced guilty
verdicts, it is possible that participants receiving PTP were still more likely to vote guilty
than participants receiving no PTP.
Lack of trial information can also explain differing results. Public opinion
surveys aimed at measuring the tendency to prejudge usually do not present information
from the trial; this is understandable, because in many of these cases, the trial has not yet
begun. Some experimental studies, however, use PTP as their only stimulus, and even
ask participants to take on the role of juror and decide the case based on the news articles
they received. Obviously, this would maximize the chances that participants base their

decisions on prejudicial information and may even cause them to “fill in the blanks”
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left by the lack of trial information with other information gleaned from the media and
personal stereotypes in order to form a cohesive story (Finkel, 1995). In addition, some
studies use only brief summaries. Kramer and Kerr (1989) found a difference between
participants viewing a short trial and participants viewing a longer trial; conviction rates
were higher in the short trial. They did not, however, find a significant interaction
between trial length and PTP exposure.
Freedman, Martin, and Mota (1998) argue that procedure and method of
measurement explain PTP effects. In their first study, participants received negative or
neutral PTP, viewed a video-taped trial, and then received either neutral instructions from
the judge or an admonition to ignore PTP information. The authors found no effect of
PTP. In their second study, participants followed the same procedure, except half of the
participants gave an additional rating of their verdict preference prior to viewing the trial.
The authors found that negative PTP led to higher guilt ratings posttrial only among those
participants who gave their opinion pretrial.
Source of the sample has also received criticism, with some questioning whether
research based on student samples is generalizable to the courts. While most of the
studies discussed previously used student samples, Sue and colleagues have shown that
these effects are also found in community samples. Sue, Smith, and Gilbert (1974)
compared student participants to participants recruited throughout the community. All
participants received a newspaper article on the case that mentioned a gun found in the
defendant’s possession; in half of the articles, the gun was the murder weapon but was

inadmissible in court (due to an illegal search), and in the other half of the articles, the
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gun was not the murder weapon. The researchers found no difference between students
and community members. Participants who were told the gun was the murder weapon
were more likely to believe the defendant was guilty; this effect was stronger among
female participants.
Bornstein (1999) also examined sample source, in an analysis of all jury
simulation studies published in Law and Human Behavior between 1977 and 1996. He
found that 65% of the studies used undergraduate samples and 55% used written trial
stimuli, and that the proportion of studies using undergraduate samples is increasing over
time. His review of the literature and its findings, however, uncovered few differences
between studies using written stimuli and those using more realistic trial presentations.
Though Bornstein states that there is not much cause for concern over the validity of less
realistic studies, he does warn that the court is often suspicious of such studies (a
sentiment that has been echoed by others: Studebaker & Penrod, 1997; Studebaker,
Robbennolt, Penrod, Pathak-Sharma, Groscup, & Devenport, 2002), and recommends
that researchers performing simulation research using student samples and/or written
stimuli follow these studies with replications that use more diverse samples and realistic
stimuli to demonstrate the robustness of the findings.
It should be noted, though, that there are a handful of field studies – studies that
have examined PTP and trial outcomes in real cases. Even these studies have found
mixed results. For example, Bruschke and Loges (1999, 2004) studied first-degree
murder and robbery cases in the federal courts and found that PTP generally had no effect

on trial outcome. Devine et al. (2009) on the other hand, found that PTP did have an
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effect on trial outcomes, even after controlling for strength of the evidence. The effect
was strongest, however, in cases of moderate strength. There were key differences in
how these researchers measured PTP; Brushke and Loges searched for defendant names
in Lexis/Nexis and counted any article that mentioned the crime, defendant, victim, or (in
some cases) the defendant’s gang, but did not measure whether the PTP was negative or
what information it contained. Devine et al., on the other hand, asked the judge on the
case whether there had been “significant pretrial publicity” (p. 140) or if any jurors had
been removed from the panel due to media exposure. These studies, as well as the others
discussed, should make it clear that the method through which a researcher studies PTP
can have an effect on the outcome of the study, even outside of the lab.
Meta-Analysis on PTP
Recently, I completed a meta-analysis on the subject of PTP (Locatelli, Fulero, &
Kluwe, 2011); many of the previously discussed effects, including the effects of
remedies, were investigated. Searches for published studies were conducted using online
databases, the American Psychological-Law Society newsletter, manual inspection of
several applied and forensic psychology journals, and reference lists. Unpublished
studies were solicited by contacting PTP researchers and with a post to the PSYCH-LAW
list-serv. The results of 99 studies provided 37 pretrial effect sizes and 68 posttrial effect
sizes of negative PTP on guilt. These two sets were meta-analyzed separately from each
other, due to the fact that some studies measured PTP effects both pretrial and posttrial.
In both cases, a random effects model was used; this model assumes that there is not a

single true effect size, but a distribution of possible effect sizes depending on
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characteristics of the study.
Many moderators were examined, including source of the sample, crime of which
defendant was accused, strength of the evidence, deliberation, trial presentation format,
judicial admonition, judicial instructions, and voir dire. Pretrial, no moderators were
significant. The grand mean effect size was r = 0.323, SE = 0.042, Z = 7.96, p < 0.001,
with a 95% confidence interval of 0.245 to 0.397. This interval is expected to contain the
true grand mean of pretrial effect sizes 95% of the time. In addition, because the
assumption of a random effects model is that the grand mean is not representative of all
studies on a topic, these analyses produced a 95% prediction interval of -0.223 to 0.893,
which reflects the distribution of possible individual study effect sizes depending on the
study’s characteristics. As this prediction interval suggests, it is not unusual for a single
study to find no effect or even a negative effect of PTP, due to the distribution of true
effect sizes, though more studies should find a positive effect of PTP.
Posttrial, several moderators were significant. Strength of the evidence was found
to affect study outcome, with studies using moderate strength cases finding the largest
effect sizes. Crime also had a significant impact; studies using sex offenses and nonviolent crimes tended to have smaller effect sizes, and studies using homicide cases
tended to have larger effect sizes. Finally, trial presentation format had a significant
effect, with studies using more realistic trial media finding smaller effect sizes. Source of
the sample and deliberation had no significant effects on study outcome. In addition,
whether participants were asked about guilt pretrial, which Freedman, Martin, and Mota

(1998) argue explains why studies find an effect of PTP, had no effect of study
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outcome when examined across all 68 studies. The grand mean effect size was r = 0.163,
SE = 0.023, Z = 7.14, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 0.118, 0.207, with a 95% prediction interval
of -0.222 to 0.550. Once again, it is not unusual for a study to find no effect or even a
negative effect of PTP, due to the distribution of true effect sizes and the characteristics
of a given study, but more studies should find positive effects.
Essentially, PTP does have an effect on verdicts and guilt ratings, both pre- and
posttrial, and many factors explain the variability in study findings. One issue that could
not be fully explored in meta-analysis was the effect of remedies. There was a great deal
of variation in combinations of remedies, and in some cases, only one study used a
particular type of remedy or combination of remedies. Some research suggests, however,
that remedies can be effective in alleviating PTP effects.
Using Remedies to Alleviate PTP
Information that is not refuted in trial can bias individual verdicts (Burke, 2000).
If information has been ruled inadmissible prior to seating a jury, such as in a pretrial
hearing, the jury may not even hear that the information is not to be used. A general
judicial admonition may or may not be effective at discounting such information. Many
studies (e.g. Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Sue,
Smith, & Gilbert, 1974) suggest general admonitions are not effective.
Admonitions specifically mentioning the forbidden information have not been
very effective, either. Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman (2005) studied strong judicial
admonitions in the context of inadmissible hearsay evidence in a civil case. Participants

received no admonition, a weak admonition that hearsay evidence is not admissible, or
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a strong admonition that jurors are prohibited from using such evidence. The authors
found no difference in verdicts, but also found that participants receiving the strong
admonition were more confident in their verdicts. Wolf and Montgomery (1977) found
that stronger and more specific admonitions increased dependence on the inadmissible
information, and also increased participants’ self-reported desire to use such information.
Similarly, Bornstein, Whisenhunt, Nemeth, and Dunaway (2002, Study 2) examined
whether a specific judicial admonition to ignore pretrial publicity would alleviate pretrial
publicity effects in a civil trial. They found a main effect for instruction. Participants
receiving instructions to ignore PTP were less likely to find the defendant liable,
including participants who did not receive any PTP. Unfortunately, instructions did not
interact with PTP.
Another method of admonishing the jury involves giving a reason to ignore the
forbidden information. Freedman, Martin, and Mota (1998, Study 1) examined a judicial
admonition, which not only contained an instruction to ignore PTP, but also included the
statement that PTP is at “risk of being unreliable” (p. 260). They found that this
admonition decreased guilt votes overall and, the authors note, even appeared to have a
stronger effect on participants who had received negative PTP, though the interaction
term was not significant.
Kassin and Sommers (1997) also studied the effect of explanations for judicial
admonitions, and found that some reasons may be more effective than others. In trial,
some participants heard a taped conversation, in which the defendant confessed to the

crime. In one condition, the tape was ruled inadmissible because it had been obtained
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illegally. In another, the tape was ruled inadmissible because it was of poor quality and
difficult to hear. When participants were told the tape was illegally obtained, they were
more likely to use the evidence. When they were told the tape was barely audible, they
followed the admonition and decided the case similarly to the control participants.
Many psychological theorists as well as legal personnel (e.g., Curtner & Kassier,
2005) have offered reasons for why these remedies are ineffective, such as psychological
reactance and ironic process theory (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005), which will be
discussed in detail later. It is possible that the remedies do not work, and that courts
should consider their “last-resort” remedies, such as change of venire and change of
venue more often. This has been recommended before (e.g., Fulero, 1987). However,
others suggest that studying remedies in experimental isolation does not actually
demonstrate how these remedies work in real-life. Bruschke & Loges (2004) discuss the
cumulative remedies hypothesis, which states that single remedies that appear ineffective
alone may be effective when combined with each other. Not only could the effects of
remedies be additive or even multiplicative, but remedies are rarely used in isolation in
actual courtrooms; judges frequently utilize more than one remedy. In addition, certain
elements that are referred to as remedies by the psychology literature are often fixed parts
of the trial: voir dire and deliberation, for instance.
Studies utilizing multiple remedies are rarely performed, though they have been
recommended by many. Carroll, Kerr, Alfini, Weaver, MacCoun, and Feldman (1986)
recommend that researchers perform a study using three groups: a control group who

views no PTP, a treatment group who views PTP, and a second treatment group who
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views PTP and is then subjected to a set of judicial remedies. Another possibility is that
certain remedies are more effective on some people, especially people with certain
attitudes. Specifically attitudes toward PTP information may affect participants’
inclination to use such information in their verdict decisions and may also influence the
effectiveness of remedies.
Legal Attitudes
A handful of studies of PTP have examined participants’ attitudes. In general,
these studies use an attitude measure to categorize participants. One way of categorizing
individuals is as authoritarian or non-authoritarian (also known as egalitarian). Sue,
Smith, and Pedroza (1975) found that, although authoritarianism affected perceived
strength of the prosecution’s case, there was no significant effect on verdict or sentence.
Another way involves classifying individuals as either “due process” or “crime
control.” Arbuthnot, Myers, and Leach (2002) asked their participants three questions
designed to measure crime control attitudes and three questions designed to measure due
process attitudes. The last three items were reverse-scored to create a composite score of
what the authors called “pro-prosecution attitudes.” These attitudes were not significant
predictors of guilt ratings.
Though PTP researchers have examined attitudes in their research, only a few
have examined the interactions between specific attitudes and PTP. Butler (2007)
examined how PTP interacts with death qualification in a murder trial. Prior research
suggests that participants who are “death-qualified” tend to be qualitatively different

from and more conviction-prone than “Witt excludables” – jurors whose beliefs on the
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death penalty are so strong (either for or against) that they could not carry out their duties
as a juror in a death penalty case. Butler’s (2007) research suggests that death-qualified
jurors may be more susceptible to PTP effects; death-qualified participants were more
likely to attend to PTP and were more likely to remember information obtained from
media sources. This, in turn, made death-qualified participants more likely to believe the
defendant was guilty. Death-qualified participants were also more likely to believe the
defendant would receive a fair trial, suggesting that they may also be more likely to state
they could be impartial jurors than “excludable” participants.
Chrzanowski (2006) also examined interactions between PTP and attitudes. In
her path analyses, she incorporated interactions between specific attitudes toward rape
and PTP bias (the degree to which the information received/recalled was pro-prosecution
or pro-defense), finding several significant effects on final verdicts. She did not,
however, examine the relationship between specific attitude and specific pieces of
information from the PTP. In addition, her results cannot be generalized to the effect of
specific attitudes on cases other than rape. Regardless, Chrzanowski’s approach is much
different than the approach other researchers have taken to studying the effect of
attitudes; most have combined scores on attitude measures to create an overall composite.
Many argue that the category into which a person falls (due process or crime control,
authoritarian or egalitarian, and so on) should affect verdict, but these categories are
based on the scores a person receives and not necessarily on their feelings about
individual pieces of information. An individual may be “due process” overall, but if he

or she has an attitude that only guilty people run from the police, finding out that a
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defendant resisted arrest would bias him or her against that defendant, perhaps regardless
of other attitudes. This may explain some researchers’ null findings when examining
attitudes.
Theories Explaining or Predicting These Effects
There are a variety of theories that explain why specific attitudes, and the strength
of those attitudes, could affect verdict preferences, regardless of the remedies used in
trial. Though PTP researchers have examined attitudes in their research, few have
integrated attitude theory into their research or used such theory to devise hypotheses.
According to Ajzen and Sexton (1999), the expectancy-value model is the most
accepted theory of how attitudes are formed. This theory states that attitudes are a
function of the strength of beliefs about the attitude object and the evaluation (good-bad,
desirable-undesirable, and so on) of that belief. Attitudes develop as more beliefs are
formed and evaluated, which occurs as more information is acquired about the attitude
object. Though an individual would not have a pre-made attitude about the defendant
before encountering the PTP, an individual would likely have attitudes about the behavior
of defendants, based on knowledge of past cases, media portrayals of crimes, and
stereotypes (Finkel, 1995). Information provided in PTP should affect a person’s beliefs
about a defendant and the likelihood of guilt, and the evaluation of these beliefs should be
influenced by pre-existing beliefs, attitudes, and biases about such pieces of information.
The stronger the attitude, the more quickly the attitude is activated in the relevant
situation (Fazio, 2000). For instance, if I discover that a defendant has confessed to a

crime, this would affect my belief about the defendant. The amount of weight I ascribe
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to this belief, however, depends on my evaluation of this information. If I believe that
confessions occur for other reasons than guilt, such as coercion by the police or a desire
to protect someone else, then the weight I ascribe to this piece of information in
generating my overall attitude toward the defendant is low. On the other hand, if I
strongly believe that a person who confesses is guilty, this information would be
activated more quickly when encountering the current defendant, receive more weight,
and strongly affect my overall attitude toward the defendant.
The question becomes whether this attitude toward the defendant in reference to
his or her guilt affects behavior, which is, in this situation, selecting a verdict. According
to Ronis, Yates, and Kirscht (1989), a great deal of research has found a weak
relationship between attitudes and behavior. Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) argue, however,
that such weak relationships are found when the attitude being measured is very general
and the behavior, very specific. When more specific attitudes are measured, they are
more predictive of specific behavior. In addition, Ajzen and Sexton (1999) argue that
strong attitudes are less likely to vary by situation, and are thus, more predictive of
behavior than weak attitudes. This means that, when specific attitudes toward PTP
information are measured, they should relate to verdict preferences, particularly when the
attitudes are strong.
When PTP is an issue in a case, the judge will often try to reduce the biasing
effects of PTP information by issuing an admonition to jurors to ignore any information
obtained outside of the trial. As has been discussed previously, research on judicial

admonition has found little support that this remedy reduces bias, at least when used in
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isolation. Various researchers have offered explanations and theories for why the
admonition is ineffective, including ironic processes (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005),
thought suppression (Studebaker & Penrod, 1997), and reactivity (Lee, Krauss, &
Lieberman, 2005).
According to Lee, Krauss, and Lieberman (2005), ironic process theory states that
when people are told to ignore certain information, two types of mental processes are
activated. The first type, conscious processes, aims at reaching the desired mental state,
by thinking about what the person has been told to think about, such as the evidence. The
second type, unconscious processes, monitors thoughts on the undesired mental state, by
looking for thoughts on what the person has been asked to ignore, such as pretrial
publicity. In trying to not think about something, the person ends up thinking about it
more. This means that, when jurors are told to ignore certain information, they are
motivated to oblige, but their efforts to follow the judge’s instructions backfire. Another
possibility, thought suppression, is similar to ironic processes. According to Studebaker
and Penrod (1997), this phenomenon occurs when a person actively tries to suppress a
particular thought, causing the thought to become more prominent, especially if the
information is emotionally arousing. In both of these cases, the individual is trying to
avoid thinking about something, but ironic processes are unconscious while thought
suppression is conscious.
Psychological reactance, on the other hand, occurs when a juror does not attempt
to suppress a thought, but instead ignores the judge’s instructions. When being told to

ignore certain information, the juror may react by believing his free will has been
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threatened (Lee, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2005), leading to arousal (Lieberman & Arndt,
2000). In order to reaffirm one’s sense of free will, and decrease this negative arousal,
the juror purposely uses the discredited information. It is difficult to determine which of
these general processes is at work, because the juror may be unaware of how she is being
affected by the judge’s instructions (Hammerl & Fulcher, 2005), making these processes
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Wolf and Montgomery (1977), however, found
that participants receiving a strong admonition reported greater desire to use such
information than others, suggesting that psychological reactance was occurring. This was
only the case when the admonition was strong, as opposed to the standard admonition. In
addition, a more recent study (Jonas, 2007) found that trait reactance only influenced
verdict and sentencing when the inadmissible information was emotional in nature.
Regardless of which of these processes is occurring, they all lead to the same
outcome – that participants will use discredited information. In addition, psychological
reactance research suggests that reactance is more likely to occur when the admonition is
strong and when it specifically threatens the participant’s choice; it also suggests that
reactance can be thought of as a personality trait (Jonas, 2007; Pavey & Sparks, 2009),
rather than a universal process. Some studies find some positive effects of admonition,
however, meaning that there may be some individual differences operating to clarify why
admonitions are effective for some people but not others. One explanation that has
received some attention is belief perseverance (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). This
phenomenon occurs when an individual continues to use a piece of information to make a

decision, even though that information has been discounted. Lieberman and Arndt
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(2000) argue that belief perseverance is not a good explanation for PTP, because it does
not explain the backfire effect, which occurs when people exposed to a judicial
admonition are more likely to use the discredited information. The study on instructions
by Freedman et al. (1998), however, suggests that jurors are not blindly using biasing
information. When participants were told a piece of evidence was inadmissible because
it was illegally obtained, they still used it, but when a piece of evidence was considered
inadmissible because it was of poor quality, participants were able to suppress that
information.
It is possible, however, that by not examining attitude toward the information in
past research, that belief perseverance effects were missed. Research suggests it is more
likely to happen in people with strong attitudes (Anderson, 1995). Belief perseverance
may explain why certain individuals continue to use biasing information even though the
judge has admonished them to ignore it. In addition, it may be strong attitudes, not
psychological reactance, that explain the backfire effect. Therefore, if belief
perseverance is operating, participants with strong attitudes about a piece of information
and its probative value should be more likely to continue to use it after being admonished
by the judge and may ascribe greater weight to this information than participants with
weaker attitudes. This is much different from the explanations discussed previously,
because ironic process, thought suppression, and reactivity effects are related to the
instructions as well as the biasing information, not an individual’s attitudes toward that
information. By also examining attitudes, then, a researcher can make a comparison

between these general processes that should affect people with strong and weak
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attitudes alike to processes like belief perseverance that should interact with attitude
strength. This allows a researcher to use theories to create and test competing hypotheses
– something which, reviewers argue, is lacking in PTP research (Bruschke & Loges,
2004).

CHAPTER THREE
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
The study will examine three variables. The first variable is participant attitudes
on specific pieces of legal information: confession, prior record, and resisting arrest. The
way a participant feels about this specific information and its probative value should be
more predictive of verdict preference when this information is included in PTP than
general attitude toward crime. The second variable is biasing information. Participants
will be randomly assigned to receive one of 3 pieces of biasing information – confession,
prior record, and behavior during arrest – or to receive a control article with no biasing
information. Finally, the third variable is a judicial admonition manipulation.
Participants will be randomly assigned to receive standard trial instructions, an
admonition specifically mentioning PTP, or a specific admonition along with a statement
meant to attack the credibility of the media information.
The following attitude hypotheses will be tested. First, attitudes are expected to
interact with PTP information to influence verdict preference. That is, an individual with
a strong attitude toward a certain piece of information will be more likely to find the
defendant guilty if PTP contains that piece of information. Participants with weak
attitudes toward the PTP information will not be influenced by negative PTP, and should
show similar verdict preferences as participants receiving neutral PTP. If this hypothesis
is confirmed, the results should look like Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude.
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Hypotheses dealing with the judicial admonitions will also be tested. Based on
prior research, it is expected that stronger, more specific judicial admonitions should have
a stronger effect than more general admonitions, and should reduce guilty verdicts. Of
particular interest in this study, however, is how judicial admonitions interact with PTP
information and prior attitudes. Based on belief perseverance literature, it is expected
that people with strong attitudes should be less affected by judicial admonitions when
presented with biasing information; the expected results will look like Figures 2, 3, and 4
below for Standard, Specific, and Strong Instructions, respectively. Alternatively, if one
of the other more general processes is operating, attitude will not interact with
admonition among participants receiving biasing information.

Figure 2. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard).
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Figure 3. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific).
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Figure 4. Expected Interaction Effect of PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong).
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
This study uses a quasi-experimental design. There are two manipulated and
randomly assigned variables – PTP and instructions – and one variable, attitude strength,
as a participant variable. PTP is considered the independent variable, and instructions
and attitude strength are moderators. To use the terminology established by Jaccard
(2001), attitude is a first-order moderator, which is expected to influence the relationship
between PTP, the independent variable, and the outcome variables, verdict and
continuous guilt rating. Instructions are second-order moderators, expected to interact
with the first-order moderator, attitude strength, and change its effect on the relationships
between PTP and outcomes.
Because the present study uses both categorical and continuous independent
variables, as well as interactions between and among those variables, multiple regression
was used. Interactions were tested using the techniques of Aiken and West (1991). This
means first-order terms were entered into the equation first, and then interactions were
entered second, to determine if they explain significant variance after first-order terms are
in the equation. Some of the hypotheses can only be tested with three-way interactions;
according to Aiken and West, to test three-way interactions, all first- and second-order
terms must be included in the regression equation. Because of this requirement, a large
number of variables are required in both equations, many of which are not being used to
39

test a hypothesis. In order to determine a priori which variables are believed to be
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significant, a table was created (see Table 1), stating all variables included in the
regression model and which hypothesis, if any, that variable tests.
Table 1. Variables and Interactions Used to Test Hypotheses.
First Order
Confession (Conf.) PTP
Prior Record (Priors) PTP
Resisting Arrest (Res.) PTP
Conf. Attitude
Priors Attitude
Res. Attitude
Specific Admonition
Strong Admonition

Hypothesis
PTP
PTP
PTP

Admonition
Admonition

Second Order
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude
Conf. PTP X Specific Admonition
Priors PTP X Specific Admonition
Res. PTP X Specific Admonition
Conf. PTP X Strong Admonition
Priors PTP X Strong Admonition
Res. PTP X Strong Admonition
Conf. Attitude X Specific Admonition
Priors Attitude X Specific Admonition
Res. Attitude X Specific Admonition
Conf. Attitude X Strong Admonition
Priors Attitude X Strong Admonition
Res. Attitude X Strong Admonition

Hypothesis
Attitude by Information
Attitude by Information
Attitude by Information
Admonition x Information
Admonition x Information
Admonition x Information
Admonition x Information
Admonition x Information
Admonition x Information

Third Order
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude X Specific Admonition
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude X Specific Admonition
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude X Specific Admonition
Conf. PTP X Conf. Attitude X Strong Admonition
Priors PTP X Prior Attitude X Strong Admonition
Res. PTP X Res. Attitude X Strong Admonition

Hypothesis
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative
Belief Perseverance vs. Alternative

In addition to including all first- and second-order terms in the equation,
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continuous predictor variables should be centered, by subtracting the variable mean. This
is to prevent issues with multicollinearity. According to Aiken and West (1991), the
regression equation including a three-way interaction should be:
Y = b1X + b2Z + b3W + b4XZ + b5XW + b6ZW + b7XZW + b0
If b7 is significant, there is a three-way interaction. In this case, the interaction
would be probed as follows. Aiken and West recommend rearranging the equation to
show the regression of Y on X, which is accomplished by factoring X out of the equation:
Y = (b1 + b4Z + b5W + b7ZW)X + (b2Z + b3W + b6ZW + b0)
The first expression is the simple slope of X and the second expression is the Yintercept. Then, X should be plotted at all possible combinations of ZH, ZL, WH, and
WL, where H refers to a value one standard deviation above the variable mean and L
refers to a value one standard deviation below the variable mean, or, if either Z or W is a
dichotomous variable, L refers to the 0 category and H to the 1 category. This will
produce 2 graphs (WL and WH), each with two regression lines (ZL and ZH).
The researcher should then test the simple slopes, to determine if the slope of the
regression of Y on X is significantly different from 0 at a given value of Z and W. The
slope is tested by calculating the first expression in the equation above at the selected
values of Z and W, then dividing the resulting slope by its standard error, computed as:
sb = [s11 + Z2s44 + W2s55 + Z2W2s77 + 2Zs14 + 2Ws15 + 2ZWs17 + 2ZWs45 + 2ZW2s47 +
2W2Zs57]½

where snn refers to the value in row n, column n of the regression variance-covariance

42

matrix.
If the higher-order term is not significant, Aiken and West (1991) give
recommendations on how to proceed. Keeping the terms in the equation will not
substantially bias the estimates of regression coefficients for lower order terms, but will
influence the power to test the significance of lower-order regression coefficients.
Therefore, the researcher should make a decision about whether these terms should be
kept in the equation or whether they should be dropped. If there is a strong theoretical
basis for an interaction, the terms should be kept in the equation. Otherwise, the
researcher should use a step-down procedure, where the higher-order terms are dropped,
and the regression analyses re-performed.
There is some theoretical basis for the three-way interactions being significant,
but these analyses are still somewhat exploratory in nature. In the event the three-way
interactions are not significant, these terms, as well as all unnecessary two-way
interactions (terms not being used to test a hypothesis), should be dropped. This will lend
more power to the remaining tests and will also produce a more parsimonious model.
Full and reduced models can also be compared:
F (m, n – k – 1) =

/

(R2in – R2out) (m)

/

(1 – R2in) (n – k – 1)
where R2in is the total variance explained in the full model, R2out is the total variance
explained in the reduced model, m is the number of terms being tested (in “in” but not
“out”) and k is the total number of predictors in the full model. If F is significant, then

the two models differ in the amount of variance explained. A non-significant F means
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the two models do not differ and the simpler model should be adopted.
Power Analysis
Many of the studies performed on PTP have used small sample sizes, and/or have
involved a large number of experimental conditions. In fact, some of the studies finding
null effects used few participants. It was common to see factorial studies with only 20
participants, or fewer, in each condition; this suggests that many researchers were using
general rules on sample size, as opposed to power analysis. When studying a
phenomenon with a small to moderate effect size, like PTP, this number may not be
sufficient. No study reviewed made any mention of a priori power analysis, even though
some researchers have tried to convince others of the importance of examining statistical
power (e.g., Cohen, 1992). Obviously, a nonsignificant result does not necessarily mean
power was low (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001), but analyzing power before beginning an
experiment will maximize the chances that one will find a significant result, if such an
effect exists.
For multiple regression, power is computed using R2 and its effect size, f 2, which
is computed as R2 divided by 1 – R2 (Cohen, 1988). More specifically, because the
present study is testing interactions, the effect size of interest is the change in R2 after
controlling for a set of variables. This first set of variables will be referred to as the
“control” variables, while the additional set will be referred to as the “treatment”
variables.

Power analysis was performed using PASS 2008. The current study uses 8
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control variables, with an additional 21 treatment variables, though it is important to
mention that only 15 of these treatment variables are being used to test hypotheses; the
additional variables are entered in the equation because they are necessary to test a threeway interaction in multiple regression (Aiken & West, 1991) and are not expected to be
significant. Based on results from a meta-analysis, the control variables are expected to
produce an R2 of approximately 0.1681, which was entered in the power analysis as 0.16
to provide a more conservative estimate. If each of the treatment variables explains less
than 0.01 of the variance in Y (R2 = 0.06, a small effect size, Cohen, 1988), a sample of
352 would be needed. This is probably an overly conservative estimate, but this number
would also provide some padding to account for any missingness or attrition in the
dataset. A sample size of 310 was selected as the minimum sample size needed (based
on power analysis with treatment R2 = 0.08), and 352 was selected as the final sample
size to account for potential missingness.

CHAPTER FIVE
PILOT TESTING
In the recent meta-analysis (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), it was found that
PTP studies most frequently use either a homicide case (29 studies, or 42.9%) or a sexual
assault case (9 studies or 13.2%). In order to generalize PTP findings to actual cases, it is
important to conduct studies using different crimes. Therefore, the current study utilized
an assault trial. Pilot testing was conducted in order to find a case with a 50% conviction
rate; PTP effects are strongest in moderate cases (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011).
Further, when this project was originally proposed, an additional variable of
witness characteristics was included (see Appendix A for a brief review of the literature
on witness characteristic effects). It was expected that a crime committed against an
elderly woman would elicit more negative affect than the same crime committed against
a middle-aged man. As part of pilot testing, this hypothesis was tested.
Finally, it was originally planned that this project would be conducted online.
Though other PTP studies have been conducted via the internet (e.g., Chrzanowski, 2006;
Studebaker et al., 2002), no studies have been performed comparing results obtained via

the internet to those obtained in the lab. Therefore, half of participants completed the
study through an online survey, and the other completed the study in the lab. It was
determined a priori that if any differences were found between lab and online results, the
main study would be conducted in the lab.
45
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Pilot 1 Methods
Participants
Participants were 259 undergraduates from the Loyola University Introductory
Psychology participant pool. About 59 percent of the participants were women.
Seventeen participants did not provide a verdict, and were dropped from analysis. Of the
remaining 242 participants, 121 completed the study in person and 121 completed the
study as an online survey.
Materials
Trial transcripts. All transcripts were based on the case of Brunner v.
Mississippi (2007). This case involved an assault on an elderly woman by a former
employee of the woman’s husband. In order to find a case with a conviction rate of 50%,
six transcripts of the same trial were created, each with a different combination of the
following evidence:
Favoring conviction


First neighbor, who reports seeing the defendant’s car in the area before
assault



Second neighbor, who reports seeing the defendant’s car in front of the
victim’s home



Victim’s identification of defendant



Case recovered from defendant’s home (which was stolen from victim’s
home)



Disgruntled employee argument (defendant was former employee of victim’s
brother, and threatened the victim’s brother when he was fired)
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Favoring acquittal


Alibi



Poor ID by victim (not wearing glasses at the time of the attack and the fact
that the brother mentioned the defendant as the perpetrator before the victim
gave identification)



Poor ID by second neighbor (unsure if make of the car matches defendant’s
car)



Explanation for recovered case

In addition, for each combination of evidence, two copies of each version were
created. One named the victim as Joseph Washington, a 45-year-old man, and the other
stated the victim was Janice Washington, a 70-year-old woman. The names and genders
of all witnesses were kept the same in all versions of the trial. In order to keep all aspects
of the trial constant, the defendant was made the former employee of the victim’s brother
(rather than the victim’s spouse as in the original case), who was living with the victim at
the time of the attack due to renovations on his home.
Posttest. Following the trial transcript, participants completed a posttest. First,
participants were asked to render a verdict, using the options “guilty” or “not guilty.”
After that, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS:
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This scale contains 20 items, 10 of which are negative
emotions such as “distressed” or “ashamed”, and 10 or which are positive emotions such
as “enthusiastic” or “proud.”
Participants were asked to rate the degree to which the trial made them experience
each emotion on a scale of 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”).
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Procedure
Participants completing the study online accessed an Opinio survey. The first
screen contained a consent script (see Appendix B). Participants were then taken to one
of 12 trial transcripts. Each major section of the trial (opening statements, witness
testimony, closing statements, jury instructions) was on its own page. Participants
completed the posttest, and were then taken to a debriefing screen (see Appendix C).
Participants completing the study in person were greeted by the experimenter;
they then received the same consent script as the online survey. If they consented to be in
the study, they approached the experimenter to obtain an envelope containing one of 12
trial transcripts followed by the post-test. Each participant was allowed to proceed
through the packet at his or her own pace. After completing the measure, participants
returned their packet to the experimenter and were debriefed in the same manner as
online participants.
Pilot 1 Results
All pilot study analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 16.
Verdicts
Percentage of guilty verdicts was computed by version, victim characteristics, and
study location (lab or online). Though certain case versions did reach the needed 50%
conviction rate in some instances, there was a great deal of variation in conviction rates;
victim characteristics and study location appeared to influence conviction rate. The
percentages are displayed in Table 2 below.
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Table 2. Conviction Rates by Trial Version, Victim, and Study Location.
Version
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6

Victim
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman
Middle-aged man
Elderly woman

Online
30.00%
20.00%
20.00%
0.00%
27.27%
20.00%
50.00%
20.00%
20.00%
80.00%
20.00%
40.00%

Lab
8.33%
20.00%
60.00%
18.18%
41.67%
30.00%
25.00%
36.36%
50.00%
10.00%
20.00%
14.29%

Victim characteristics were coded as 0 (middle-aged man) and 1 (elderly woman);
study location was also coded as 0 (online) and 1 (lab). Interaction terms were created
with the three variables: version x victim, version x location, victim x location, and
version x victim x location. A logistic regression was performed, using all variables and
interactions; version and any interaction using version was entered into the logistic
regression as a categorical variable1.
The abbreviated results of the logistic regression can be found in Table 3 below
(complete results for all variables, including dummy variables, can be found in Appendix
D). The overall model was significant, χ2 (df = 23) = 37.979, p = 0.026, McFadden’s R2
= 0.151, and correctly classified 74.8% of participants. Though none of the individual
variables reached conventional levels of significance, the overall test of the three-way
interaction term was significant, Wald (df = 5) = 11.90, p = 0.036.
1

When a logistic regression predictor is entered as “categorical,” SPSS creates a series of dummy codes for
analysis. This means that for a variable with k categories, the number of dummy variables, and
corresponding beta coefficients, is k – 1.
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Table 3. Overall Effects of Location, Version, and Victim on Verdicts.
Predictor
Location
Overall Version
Victim
Overall Location X Version
Overall Victim X Version
Victim X Location
Overall Victim X Location X Version
Constant
Notes. +, p < 0.10, * p < 0.05

B
0.000

SE
1.118

0.981

1.021

-1.386

1.683

-1.386

0.791

Wald
0.000
3.178
0.924
7.520
9.169
0.678
11.896*
3.075+

Emotional Reactions
The 10 negative items were combined to create a single negative composite. In
addition, the 10 positive items were combined to create a positive composite. If the
victim gender is having the desired effect, there should be an increase in negative
emotion, meaning a significant difference between victim conditions on the negative
composite. Because positive emotion is considered to be independent of negative
emotion (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and participants in either condition should
experience little to no positive emotion, there should be no difference on the positive
composite.
A 2 (victim) x 6 (version) x 2 (location) ANOVA was performed for the negative
affect composite. There was a significant effect of victim, F (1,218) = 8.801, p = 0.003.
Participants reported experiencing more negative affect when the victim was an elderly
woman (M = 16.3, SD = 5.48) than when the victim was a middle-aged man (M = 14.3,
SD = 4.4). In addition, there was a significant interaction between location and version,
F (5,218) = 2.265, p = 0.049. Additional simple effects testing revealed that for
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participants completing the study online, there were no differences in reported negative
affect by version, F (5,115) = 1.056, p = 0.389. For participants completing the study in
the lab, there was a significant effect of version, F (5, 115) = 2.879, p = 0.017;
participants receiving version 1 (M = 13.0, SD = 3.295) experienced significantly less
negative affect than participants receiving version 4 (M = 18.11, SD = 6.54). No other
differences were significant.
The same 2 x 6 x 2 ANOVA was performed using the positive affect composite.
There was a significant main effect of version, F (5,218) = 2.291, p = 0.047; post-hoc
tests revealed that the only significant difference was between version 4 and version 5.
No other effects were significant.
Pilot 1 Discussion
The method in which one completed the study had an influence on study results.
Specifically, method interacted with victim and the facts of the case to influence whether
a participant chose to convict. It is unclear as to the reason for these effects. There are a
variety of possible explanations for the differences, but none that can be tested with the
present data. As one can see from the conviction rates in Table 1 above, in some cases,
online participants were more likely to convict, but in other cases, they were less likely to
convict. Without further research, it is difficult to infer why case information was viewed
so differently online versus in the lab. It is possible that these differences were a product
of this specific case or even the sample selected. It may be that participants who choose
to complete a study online are qualitatively different from participants who choose to
complete a study in the lab.
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Whatever the reason for the differences, however, there were differences,
which could mean that jury research performed online may find different results in the
lab. Because lab settings are more similar to (though arguably still quite different from)
actual jury trials than online settings, one could conclude that lab studies will provide
more generalizable results. At the very least, these differences suggest that there are
differences for this specific case tested with this specific sample. Therefore, since the
next phase of this project will use the same case and sample source, additional pilot
testing and the project itself will be performed in the lab.
Because a case of moderate strength was not found, additional pilot testing was
necessary. Using the results of the first pilot test, version 4 was selected for additional
work; this is because version 4 had the most consistent conviction rate across the two
victims. Certain aspects of this case were strengthened. The victim’s identification of
the attacker was strengthened. In previous versions, the victim contacted his/her brother
after the attack, and the brother asked if the attacker had been the defendant; instead, the
victim clearly identified the defendant to his/her brother first. The second neighbor’s
identification was also strengthened.
Pilot 2 Methods
Participants
Participants were 24 undergraduates from the Loyola University Introductory
Psychology participant pool. About 54 percent were women. All participants completed
the study in the lab.
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Materials
Trial transcript. All participants received the strengthened version 4 transcript.
In one half of the transcripts, the victim was the middle-aged man; in the other half, the
victim was the elderly woman.
Posttest. The same posttests were used.
Procedure
Participants followed the same procedure as lab participants in Pilot 1. Upon
arriving at the lab, participants were randomly assigned to receive the middle-aged man
version of the transcript, or the elderly woman version of the transcript.
Pilot 2 Results
All analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 16.
Verdicts
Percentages of guilty verdicts were computed for both victim conditions. When
the victim was a middle-aged man, 41.7% of participants convicted; when the victim was
an elderly woman, 58.3% of participants convicted. Both of these cases would be
considered of moderate strength.
Emotional Reactions
Once again, two composites were created, one negative and one positive.
Differences were tested with two independent sample t-tests. No significant differences
were found for either composite, tnegative (22) = -0.785, p = 0.456 and tpositive (22) = -1.497,
p = 0.149. Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 4 below.
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Table 4. Means (and Standard Deviations) of Affect by Condition.
Victim

Negative Affect

Positive Affect

Elderly woman

17.75 (6.384)

26.42 (4.699)

Middle-aged man

19.75 (6.538)

30.08 (7.064)

Pilot 2 Discussion
By strengthening certain aspects of the case, two moderate versions of the trial
were found. Unfortunately, this version yielded no significant difference between victim
conditions on reported negative affect. Because it was expected that the effect of victim
on conviction in the actual study would be mediated by negative affect, further pilot
testing would be necessary to find a suitable combination of evidence. It was decided
that for the present project, the victim variable would be dropped from the study. Future
research should examine the present variables and relationships with different victims
and different cases.

CHAPTER SIX
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 358 Loyola students, obtained through the Introductory
Psychology participant pool. They were recruited for a study on decision making about
court cases. Participants were predominantly freshmen, women, and Caucasian; only 2
percent had ever served on a jury before. See Table 5 below for complete information
about the sample.
Table 5. Sample Demographic Information.
Variable
Age
Variable
Gender

Race / Ethnicity

Year in School

Prior Jury Experience

Male
Female
Missing
Caucasian
Hispanic/Latino
Asian-American
African-American/Black
Other
Prefer Not to Answer
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
No
Yes
Missing
55

M (SD)
19.1 (1.72)

Range
18 – 38

Frequency
108
249
1
245
43
35
13
18
4
198
107
26
27
347
7
4

Percent
30.2%
69.6%
0.3%
68.4%
12.0%
9.8%
3.6%
5.0%
1.1%
55.3%
29.9%
7.3%
7.5%
96.9%
2.0%
1.1%
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Materials
News Article
A news article was written about the case; this article was based on similar crime
news articles (see Appendix E). Four versions of the article were created. All versions
stated that an arrest had been made in a recent assault on Joseph Washington, and gave
some background on the crime. The article then named the defendant, and gave some
information on his upcoming court appearances. The neutral version did not contain any
additional information; this version was received by 83 participants. The three PTP
versions contained an additional line, between the statement about arrest and information
on court appearances. This line said “According to a police source,” followed by one of
three pieces of biasing information: 1) “the suspect has confessed to the crime” (received
by 92 participants), 2) “the suspect did not cooperate during arrest” (received by 88
participants), and 3) “the suspect has been convicted of a similar crime in the past”
(received by 95 participants).
Questionnaire
A voir dire questionnaire was also created (see Appendix F). This questionnaire
first gathered basic demographic information: age, gender, race, and whether the
participant has served on a jury before. Next, the questionnaire contained 34 attitude
questions, which were drawn from the Legal Attitudes of Prospective Jurors scale
(Kravitz, Culter, & Brock, 1993) and General Attitudes Toward the Legal System scale
(Schiffhauer & Wrightsman, 1995, both reprinted in Wrightsman, Batson, & Edkins,
2004). Thirty-two of the questions were received by all participants. The remaining two

questions varied. Participants who received biasing information in their news article
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received two attitude questions that dealt with the specific information they received;
those receiving confession information received two confession questions, those
receiving prior conviction information received two prior record questions, and those
receiving information that the suspect did not cooperate received two questions on
resisting arrest. Participants in the neutral group were randomly assigned to receive one
of these three question pairs.
Trial Transcript
All participants received the trial transcript from Pilot 2, with the middle-aged
man as the victim (see Appendix G).
Jury Instructions
Jury instructions were included at the end of the trial transcript (see Appendix H).
Participants received one of three instructions; 120 received standard instructions. One
hundred twenty-two received standard instructions that also warned jurors not to use
information from the media (specific instructions). Finally, 116 participants received the
specific instructions with the additional caution that media information can be inaccurate
(strong instructions).
Posttest
Finally, a two-question posttest was used to obtain participant verdicts, with the
choices being guilty and not guilty, as well as a rating of guilt, ranging from 1 –
definitely not guilty to 7 – definitely guilty (see Appendix I).
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Procedure
The study was conducted in the lab. Participants were greeted by the
experimenter, and received the consent script (see Appendix J). Those who agreed to
participate were given a packet containing all necessary materials. Participants were
allowed to proceed through the packet at their own pace.
Participants first received a news article, which they were told is to introduce
them to the case. After reading the article, the participant completed the questionnaire,
which they were told is common procedure for potential jurors. Participants next read the
abbreviated trial transcript about an assault on a middle-aged man followed by standard,
specific, or strong instructions. Participants then selected a verdict and rated defendant
guilt. After completing the materials, they returned the materials to the experimenter and
were debriefed (see Appendix K).

CHAPTER SEVEN
RESULTS
All data were analyzed using R version 2.12.1 (R Development Core Team,
2010); in addition, the QuantPsyc (Fletcher, 2010) and psych (Revelle, 2010) R libraries
were used. Six participants were dropped from analysis because they were missing one
or both of the key attitude items that corresponded to PTP condition (confession, resisting
arrest or prior record), leaving 353 participants. Of these participants, 121 responded to
confession attitude items (n = 92 receiving confession PTP, n = 29 receiving neutral
PTP), 115 responded to resisting arrest items (n = 87 receiving resistance PTP, n = 28
receiving neutral PTP), and 117 responded to prior record items (n = 92 receiving prior
record PTP, n = 25 receiving neutral PTP).
The two confession attitude items were averaged together to create a confession
composite; a resisting arrest composite and prior record composite were created in the
same way. To prepare variables for analysis, attitude composites were centered by
subtracting the mean, dummy variables were created for PTP and instructions, and
interaction terms were created by multiplying variables together, in accordance with the
recommendations of Aiken and West (1991). Means and standard deviations were
performed on all variables under study (see Table 6 below). Additionally, correlations
between predictor variables and the outcomes were performed (see Table 7 below).

59

60
Table 6. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables and Interaction Terms.
Variable

n

Mean

SD

Confession Attitude Item 1
Confession Attitude Item 2
Overall Confession Attitude
Overall Confession Attitude (Centered)

121
121
121
121

2.88
2.42
2.65
0.00

1.06
0.96
0.77
0.77

Resisting Arrest Attitude Item 1
Resisting Arrest Attitude Item 2
Overall Resisting Arrest Attitude
Overall Resisting Arrest Attitude (Centered)

115
115
115
115

2.25
2.63
2.44
0.00

1.07
1.02
0.88
0.88

Prior Record Attitude Item 1
Prior Record Attitude Item 2
Overall Prior Record Attitude
Overall Prior Record Attitude (Centered)

117
117
117
117

3.49
3.27
3.38
0.00

1.09
0.93
0.77
0.77

Interaction Terms
Confession Attitude x PTP
Confession Attitude x Specific Instructions
Confession Attitude x Strong Instructions
Confession Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions
Confession Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions

121
121
121
121
121

-0.02
-0.03
-0.05
-0.05
-0.04

0.67
0.46
0.39
0.41
0.33

Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP
Resisting Arrest Attitude x Specific Instructions
Resisting Arrest Attitude x Strong Instructions
Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions
Resisting Arrest Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions

115
115
115
115
115

-0.03
0.05
-0.04
0.01
-0.03

0.78
0.51
0.40
0.42
0.33

Prior Record Attitude x PTP
Prior Record Attitude x Specific Instructions
Prior Record Attitude x Strong Instructions
Prior Record Attitude x PTP x Specific Instructions
Prior Record Attitude x PTP x Strong Instructions

117
117
117
117
117

0.00
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.01

0.67
0.42
0.48
0.34
0.43

Dependent Variables
Verdict
353
Guilt
353
Notes. Interaction terms use centered attitude composite variables.

0.47
4.81

0.50
1.20

Attitude Items
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Table 7. Correlations between Predictors and Outcome Variables
Variable
PTP
Confession
Resisting Arrest
Prior Record

Verdict

Guilt Rating

0.04
-0.06
0.03

0.10+
-0.01
0.03

0.00
0.04

-0.06
0.09+

Attitude
Confession
Resisting Arrest
Prior Record

0.12
0.15
0.34**

0.01
0.17+
0.32**

PTP X Instruction
Confession x Specific
Confession x Strong
Resist x Specific
Resist x Strong
Prior x Specific
Prior x Strong

0.03
0.08
0.06
-0.09+
-0.01
0.03

0.00
0.18*
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01

Attitude x PTP
Confession
Resisting Arrest
Prior

0.10
0.12
0.39**

0.05
0.15+
0.39**

Attitude x Instruction
Confession x Specific
Confession x Strong
Resist x Specific
Resist x Strong
Prior x Specific
Prior x Strong

0.21*
-0.08
0.01
0.16+
0.22*
0.23*

0.05
-0.06
-0.01
0.19*
0.22*
0.23*

PTP x Instructions x Attitude
Confession x Specific
Confession x Strong
Resist x Specific
Resist x Strong
Prior x Specific
Prior x Strong

0.15
-0.04
0.05
0.06
0.18+
0.25*

0.06
-0.06
0.07
0.07
0.23*
0.24*

Instructions
Specific (vs. Standard)
Strong (vs. Standard)

Dependent Variables
Verdict
0.61**
Notes. Attitude variables are centered composites; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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Regression Analyses on Guilt
Guilt data were analyzed with linear multiple regressions. One regression was
performed to compare effects of the four types of PTP (confession, resisting arrest, prior
record, and neutral) and three types of instructions (standard, specific, and strong) on
guilt ratings. This model included three dummy variables to reflect PTP (with neutral
PTP as the comparison group) and two dummy variables to reflect instructions (with
standard instructions as the comparison group). The overall model was marginally
significant, R2 = 0.03, F (5,347) = 1.89, p = 0.10 (see Table 8 for regression coefficients).
One predictor was significant; participants receiving confession PTP assigned higher
guilt ratings than participants receiving neutral PTP (β = 0.16, t = 2.44, p = 0.02).
Additionally, the effect of prior record PTP was marginally significant; participants
receiving prior record PTP assigned higher guilt ratings than participants receiving
neutral PTP (β = 0.11, t = 1.69, p = 0.09).
Table 8. Predicting Guilt Rating with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions.
Predictor
Constant
Confession PTP
Resisting Arrest PTP
Prior Record PTP
Specific Instructions
Strong Instructions

B
4.52
0.44
0.23
0.31
-0.06
0.20

SE
0.16
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.16

β
0.16
0.08
0.11
-0.03
0.08

t
28.56**
2.44*
1.22
1.69+
-0.40
1.27

0.03+
R2
F(5,347) = 1.89, p = 0.095
F
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Additionally, separate regressions were performed on each group to examine the
effects of PTP, attitudes, and instructions, and their interactions. Three regressions
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included participants who received confession PTP and answered confession attitude
items, and the neutral participants responding to the confession attitude questions (n =
121); three regressions included participants receiving resisting arrest PTP and attitude
questions, and neutral participants responding to the resisting arrest items (n = 115); two
regressions included participants receiving prior record PTP and attitude questions, and
their corresponding neutral participants (n = 117).
Confession
Three regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to confession
PTP, confession attitudes, and jury instructions. The first regression only included main
effects. The overall model was not significant, R2 = 0.05, F (4,116) = 1.53, p = 0.20 (see
Table 9 for regression coefficients). One predictor was significant; participants receiving
strong jury instructions assigned higher guilt ratings than participants receiving standard
instructions (β = 0.23, t = 2.13, p = 0.04).
The second model, in which interaction terms were added, also was not
significant, R2= 0.10, F (11,109) = 1.14, p = 0.34 (see Table 9 for regression
coefficients). The main effect of strong jury instructions was no longer significant;
instead, the interaction between confession PTP and strong instructions was significant (β
= 0.53, t = 2.21, p = 0.03). As previously discussed, when higher-order interaction terms
are not significant, Aiken and West (1991) recommend using a step-down procedure, in
which the three-way interaction terms and any two-way terms not being used to test a
hypothesis are dropped, and the regression re-performed.

B
4.55
0.22
0.11
0.58
0.08

Model 1
SE
β
0.27
0.26 0.08
0.27 0.04
0.27 0.23
0.15 0.05
t
16.90**
0.86
0.69
2.13*
0.56

B
4.98
-0.39
-0.19
-0.55
-0.42
0.46
1.46
0.77
0.47
0.09
-0.67
-0.45

Model 2
SE
β
0.38
0.44 -0.14
0.55 -0.07
0.59 -0.21
0.53 -0.27
0.64
0.16
0.66
0.53
0.61
0.43
0.78
0.18
0.75
0.03
0.87 -0.23
0.87 -0.12
t
13.27**
-0.89
-0.34
-0.95
-0.80
0.72
2.21*
1.27
0.60
0.12
-0.77
-0.52

B
4.95
-0.32
-0.10
-0.50
-0.25
0.33
1.40
0.42

Model 3
SE
β
0.36
0.42 -0.11
0.52 -0.04
0.57 -0.20
0.31 -0.16
0.61
0.12
0.65
0.51
0.35
0.23

t
13.62**
-0.75
-0.19
-0.89
-0.81
0.54
2.16*
1.20
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0.05
0.10
0.09
R2
F(4,116) = 1.53, p = 0.20
F(11,109) = 1.14, p = 0.34
F(7,113) = 1.68, p = 0.12
F
ΔR2
0.05
0.04
ΔF
ΔF(7,109) = 0.92, p = 0.49
ΔF(4,113) = 1.82, p = 0.13
Notes. PTP = Confession PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Confession Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific
Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction terms;
Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; change in R2 and F compares the current model to Model 1; * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01.

Predictor
Constant
PTP
Specific Instructions
Strong Instructions
Attitude
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

Table 9. Predicting Guilt Rating with Confession PTP, Attitude, and Instructions
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A third regression was performed, dropping the two three-way interaction
terms, and two attitudes x instructions terms. This model was also not significant, R2=
0.09, F (7,113) = 1.68, p = 0.12 (see Table 9 for regression coefficients). Once again, the
interaction between confession PTP and strong instructions was significant (β = 0.51, t =
2.16, p = 0.03). To probe this effect, simple slopes were computed and tested using a
web-based program by Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2004a). Tests of the slopes showed
that the difference between Confession PTP-Strong Instructions and Neutral PTP-Strong
Instructions was significant, simple slope = 1.078, SE = 0.477, t = 2.26, p = 0.026. No
other differences were significant. Predicted values are plotted below (see Figure 1).
Figure 5. Effect of Confession PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean).
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Three regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to resisting arrest
PTP, resisting arrest attitudes, and jury instructions. The first regression only included
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main effects. The overall model was not significant, R = 0.05, F (4,110) = 1.43, p =
0.23 (see Table 10 for regression coefficients). One predictor, attitudes, was significant;
participants with stronger beliefs that resisting arrest indicates guilt assigned higher guilt
ratings (β = 0.19, t = 2.01, p = 0.05).
The second model, in which interaction terms were added, also was not
significant, R2= 0.14, F (11,103) = 1.57, p = 0.12 (see Table 10 for regression
coefficients). The main effect of attitude was no longer significant, but the interaction
between resisting arrest PTP and specific instructions was marginally significant (β =
0.47, t = 1.91, p = 0.06). Because the higher order (three-way interaction) terms were not
significant, these terms and two-way terms not being used to test hypotheses were
dropped, and the regression was performed again.
The third model was marginally significant, R2= 0.10, F (7,107) = 1.77, p = 0.10
(see Table 10 for regression coefficients). The main effect of specific instructions was
significant (β = -0.54, t = -2.35, p = 0.02). Overall, participants receiving specific jury
instructions assigned lower guilt ratings than participants receiving standard instructions.
This was qualified, however, by a significant interaction between resisting arrest PTP and
specific instructions (β = 0.61, t = 2.53, p = 0.01). To probe this effect, simple slopes
were calculated and tested using a web-based program (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer,
2004a). The difference between Resisting Arrest PTP-Specific Instructions and Neutral
PTP-Specific Instructions was significant, with participants receiving specific
instructions and biasing PTP assigning higher guilt ratings than participants receiving
specific instructions and neutral PTP, simple slope = 1.156, SE = 0.453, t = 2.55,

B
4.43
0.37
-0.05
0.06
0.25

Model 1
SE
β
0.26
0.25 0.14
0.26 -0.02
0.26 0.02
0.12 0.19
t
16.80**
1.47
-0.20
0.23
2.01*

B
5.08
-0.46
-0.96
-0.63
0.71
1.23
0.91
-0.48
-0.93
0.36
0.89
-0.28

Model 2
SE
β
0.38
0.43 -0.17
0.58 -0.40
0.52 -0.26
0.60
0.55
0.65
0.47
0.60
0.33
0.63 -0.33
0.73 -0.42
0.74
0.13
0.79
0.33
0.83 -0.08
t
13.45**
-1.07
-1.65+
-1.23
1.20
1.91+
1.52
-0.77
-1.27
0.49
0.27
-0.34

B
5.05
-0.43
-1.31
-0.63
0.47
1.59
0.90
-0.22

Model 3
SE
β
0.38
0.43 -0.16
0.56 -0.54
0.52 -0.26
0.27
0.36
0.63
0.61
0.60
0.33
0.30 -0.16

t
13.48**
-1.02
-2.35*
-1.23
1.72+
2.53**
1.50
-0.77

0.05
0.14
0.10+
R2
F(4,110) = 1.43, p = 0.23
F(11,103) = 1.57, p = 0.12
F(7,107) = 1.77, p = 0.10
F
2
ΔR
0.09
0.05+
ΔF
F(7,103) = 1.62, p = 0.14
F(3,107) = 2.17, p = 0.10
Notes. PTP = Resisting Arrest PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Resisting Arrest Attitude (Centered); Specific =
Specific Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction
terms; Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; change in R2 and F compares the current model to Model 1; * p
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Predictor
Constant
PTP
Specific
Strong
Attitude
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

Table 10. Predicting Guilt Rating with Resisting Arrest PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.
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p = 0.012. No other differences were significant. (Predicted values are plotted in
Figure 2.)
Figure 6. Effect of Resisting Arrest PTP and Instructions (Attitude = Mean).
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Prior Record
Two regressions were performed to test hypotheses pertaining to prior record
PTP, prior record attitudes, and jury instructions. The first regression only included main
effects. The overall model was significant, R2 = 0.14, F (4,112) = 4.46, p = 0.002 (see
Table 11 for regression coefficients). One predictor was significant; participants with
stronger attitudes toward prior record information indicating guilt gave higher guilt
ratings (β = 0.33, t = 3.71, p = 0.003). Additionally, the effect of PTP was marginally
significant, with participants receiving prior record PTP assigning higher guilt rating than
participants receiving neutral PTP (β = 0.14, t = 1.64, p = 0.10).

B
4.62
0.43
-0.38
-0.14
0.53

Model 1
SE
β
0.28
0.27
0.14
0.27 -0.18
0.27 -0.05
0.14
0.33
t
16.56**
1.64+
-1.42
-0.51
3.71**

B
4.48
0.62
-0.75
0.46
-1.62
0.35
-0.76
2.37
1.56
1.80
-1.48
-1.86

Model 2
SE
β
0.37
0.43
0.21
0.56
-0.29
0.56
0.18
0.59
-1.01
0.63
0.13
0.63
-0.27
0.66
1.28
0.74
0.53
0.761
0.70
0.85
-0.41
0.85
-0.64
t
12.05**
1.45
-1.34
0.83
-2.72**
0.56
-1.19
3.62**
2.10*
2.37*
-1.74+
-2.20*

0.27**
0.14**
R2
F(4,112) = 4.46, p = 0.002
F(11,105) = 3.56, p = 0.0003
F
2
ΔR
0.13**
ΔF
F(7,105) = 2.77, p = 0.01
Notes. PTP = Prior Record PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Prior Record Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific
Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction terms; *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Predictor
Constant
PTP
Specific
Strong
Attitude
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

Table 11. Predicting Guilt Rating with Prior Record PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.
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The second model, in which interaction terms were added, was also significant,
R2= 0.27, F (11,105) = 3.56, p = 0.0003 (see Table 11 for regression coefficients). The
main effect of attitudes was still significant, but was in the opposite direction (β = -1.01, t
= -2.72, p = 0.01). This effect was qualified by several significant interactions, including
a significant interaction between PTP and attitude, a significant three-way interaction
with PTP, attitude, and strong jury instructions (β = -0.64, t = -2.20, p = 0.03), and a
marginally significant three-way interaction with PTP, attitude, and specific jury
instructions (β = -0.41, t = -1.74, p = 0.09).
To probe these interactions, simple slopes were calculated and tested using a webbased program for three-way interactions (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2004b). Analyses
show that participants who have a strong attitude that a prior record indicates guilt assign
a higher guilt rating when they learned of a prior record in PTP, and assign a lower guilt
rating when PTP was neutral, simple slope = -1.204, SE = 0.626, t = -1.922, p = 0.057.
On the other hand, participants who do not believe a prior record indicates guilt assign a
lower guilt rating when PTP contains prior record and a higher guilt rating when PTP is
neutral, simple slope = 2.451, SE = 0.698, t = 3.513, p=0.0007. This effect is plotted in
Figure 3.
This effect is qualified, however, by significant three-way interactions between
PTP, attitude, and instructions. When standard instructions are used, attitude has a strong
influence on the verdicts preferences of both participants receiving neutral and biasing
PTP. When specific instructions are used, attitude no longer has an effect for those
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receiving neutral PTP, but has the expected effect among those receiving prior record
PTP. Finally, when strong instructions are used, attitude has a small effect on verdict.
These results confirm that attitude interacts with PTP information, but only when
standard instructions are used. Stronger instructions appear to reduce this effect.
Predicted values for combinations of PTP (Priors or Neutral), Instructions (Specific or
Strong), and Attitudes (-1 SD or +1 SD) are plotted below; see Figure 4 for the interaction
when specific instructions are used, and Figure 5 for the interaction when strong
instructions are used.
Figure 7. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Standard).
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Figure 8. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Specific).
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Figure 9. Effect of Prior Record (Priors) PTP and Attitude (Instructions = Strong).
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Logistic Regression Analyses on Verdict
Verdict data were analyzed in logistic multiple regressions. First, the overall
effects of PTP and instructions were analyzed, with three dummy variables reflecting
PTP (with neutral as the comparison group) and two dummy variable reflecting
instructions (with standard as the comparison group). The model provided a poor fit for
the data, χ2 (df = 347) = 485.54, p < 0.0001, correctly predicting 67.4 percent of verdicts,
and yielded no significant predictors (see Table 12 for coefficients).
Table 12. Predicting Verdict with Type of PTP and Jury Instructions.
Predictor
B
Constant
-0.26
Confession PTP
0.14
Resisting Arrest PTP
-0.20
Prior Record PTP
0.10
Specific Instructions
0.13
Strong Instructions
0.22
Notes. No predictors were significant.

SE
0.266
0.305
0.311
0.305
0.261
0.263

Wald
-0.98
0.47
-0.64
0.31
0.51
0.85

Additional logistic regressions were performed to examine PTP, attitudes, and
instructions: three regressions to include “confession” participants; three regressions
including “resisting arrest” participants; and three regressions including “prior record”
participants.
Confession
The first regression included the main effects of PTP, instructions, and attitude.
Overall, the model provided a poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 116) = 163.92, p = 0.0023,
correctly predicting 80.2 percent of verdicts; none of the variables were significant
predictors of verdict (see Table 13 for coefficients).
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Table 13. Predicting Verdict with Confession PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.
Model 1
Predictor
B
SE Wald
Constant
-0.45 0.46 -0.97
PTP
0.08 0.44 0.18
Specific
0.48 0.46 1.04
Strong
0.65 0.46 1.40
Attitude
0.40 0.25 1.57
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

B
0.17
-0.77
-0.90
-1.08
0.07
1.75
1.97
0.40
3.89
-1.23
-3.52
0.66

Model 2
Model 3
SE Wald
B
SE Wald
0.62 0.27 0.14 0.61 0.22
0.74 -1.03 -0.73 0.73 -1.01
1.14 -0.79 -0.19 0.88 -0.22
1.07 -0.94 -0.59 0.97 -0.61
0.89 0.08 0.29 0.53 0.54
1.28 1.37 0.95 1.04 0.91
1.20 1.64+ 1.64 1.11 1.47
1.02 0.39 0.17 0.61 0.28
2.64 -0.90
1.36 -0.90
2.74 -1.29
1.56 0.42

Notes. PTP = Confession PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Confession
Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Strong =
Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction terms; Model
3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; + p < 0.10
In the second model, two- and three-way interactions were added. Once again,
this model provided poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 109) = 152.93, p = 0.004, predicting
87.6 percent of verdicts. The interaction between PTP and strong instructions was
marginally significant; participants receiving PTP and strong instructions were over 3
times more likely to vote guilty than participants receiving neutral PTP and strong
instructions (see Table 13 for coefficients). Because the overall model provided a poor
fit, and neither of the three-way interactions was significant, three-way interactions and
two-way interactions between attitude and instructions were removed, and the logistic
regression was re-performed. This third model still provided poor fit for the data, χ2 (df =
113) = 161.65, p = 0.002, correctly predicting 82.6 percent of verdicts, and yielded no
significant predictors (see Table 13 for regression coefficients).
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Resisting Arrest
The first logistic regression included only main effects. This model provided
poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 110) = 152.01, p = 0.005, predicting 70.4 percent of verdicts,
and yielded no significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients).
Table 14. Predicting Verdict with Resisting Arrest PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.
Model 1
Predictor
B
SE Wald
Constant
-0.49 0.48 -1.03
PTP
-0.02 0.45 -0.05
Specific
0.51 0.46 1.11
Strong
-0.03 0.48 -0.07
Attitude
0.31 0.22 1.41
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

B
-0.15
-0.46
-0.38
0.35
0.79
1.25
-0.51
-0.45
-1.11
1.49
0.98
-1.56

Model 2
Model 3
SE Wald
B
SE
0.70 -0.21
-0.15
0.69
0.80 -0.58
-0.45
0.79
1.07 -0.36
-1.01
1.11
1.09 0.32
0.19
0.95
1.12 0.70
0.71
0.55
1.20 1.05
1.88
1.23
1.24 -0.42
-0.36
1.11
2
1.18 -0.38 -4163.00 0.60
1.38 -0.80
1.76 0.85
1.49 0.66
1.90 -0.82

Wald
-0.22
-0.57
-0.91
0.20
1.30
1.53
-0.32
-0.69

Notes. PTP = Resisting Arrest PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall
Resisting Arrest Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to
Standard; Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all
interaction terms; Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; no
predictors were significant
The second model, which added interaction terms, also provided poor fit, χ2 (df =
103) = 144.41, p = 0.004, predicting 79.1 percent of verdicts; once again, there were no
significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients). The third model, which
dropped the three-way and attitude by instructions interaction terms, provided poor fit, χ2
(df = 107) = 147.97, p = 0.005, predicted 76.5 percent of verdicts, and yielded no
significant predictors (see Table 14 for regression coefficients).

2

According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), large parameter estimates and standard errors occur when there
are too few cases to adequately test the number of predictors.
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Prior Record
The first logistic regression included only main effects. This model provided
poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 112) = 144.38, p = 0.021, predicting 83.8 percent of verdicts.
One variable, attitude, was a significant predictor (coefficient = 1.05, Wald test = 3.575, p
= 0.004); individuals with a strong attitude (1 SD above the mean) are over 2 times more
likely to vote guilty than individuals with a neutral (mean level) attitude and over 5 times
more likely to vote guilt than individuals with a weak attitude (1 SD below the mean; see
Table 15 for regression coefficients).
Table 15. Predicting Verdict with Prior Record PTP, Attitude, and Instructions.
Predictor
Constant
PTP
Specific
Strong
Attitude
PTP X Specific
PTP X Strong
PTP X Attitude
Attitude X Specific
Attitude X Strong
PTP X Attitude X Specific
PTP X Attitude X Strong

B
0.16
0.06
-0.77
-0.02
1.05

Model 1
SE Wald
0.51 0.32
0.50 0.13
0.50 -1.56
0.50 -0.04
0.29 3.58**

B
0.16
0.11
18.83
1.19
-2.79
18.17
-1.48
4.46
31.79
2.17
-32.15
2.35

Model 2
SE
0.84
0.95
1499.00
1.30
1.91
1499.00
1.43
2.04
2419.08
2.17
2419.08
2.36

Wald
0.19
0.12
-0.01
0.92
-1.46
0.01
-1.03
2.18*
0.01
1.00
-0.01
-0.99

B
0.20
0.04
-2.40
1.11
-0.53
1.75
-1.37
2.02

Model 3
SE
Wald
0.68 0.30
0.80 0.05
1.33 -1.80+
1.12 0.99
0.64 -0.83
1.46 1.20
1.27 -1.07
0.74 2.72**

Notes. PTP = Prior Record PTP (Received = 1, Neutral = 0); Attitude = Overall Prior
Record Attitude (Centered); Specific = Specific Jury Instructions compared to Standard;
Strong = Strong Jury Instructions compared to Standard; Model 2 adds all interaction
terms; Model 3 includes only two-way terms used to test hypotheses; + p < 0.10, * p <
0.05, ** p < 0.01
The second model, which added interaction terms, provided acceptable fit, χ2 (df
= 105) = 127.60, p = 0.066, and predicted 85.5 percent of verdicts; additionally, the
interaction between attitude and PTP was significant (see Table 15 for regression
coefficients). Though this model provided acceptable fit for the data, dropping the non-
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significant three-way interaction and attitude x instructions interactions would provide
more power.
The third model, which dropped the three-way and attitude by instructions
interaction terms, also provided acceptable fit, χ2 (df = 109) = 133.39, p = 0.056, and
predicted 87.2 percent of verdicts. Additionally, the interaction between attitude and PTP
was still significant (see Table 15 for regression coefficients). This effect was probed
using the web-based program for two-way interactions (Preacher, Curran, and Bauer,
2004a). Though none of the simple slopes were significant, the following trends were
observed. Participants with a weak attitude (1 SD below the mean) who received neutral
PTP were 4.5 times more likely to vote guilty than participants with low attitude who
received prior record PTP, simple slope = -1.513, SE = 0.962, t = -1.572, p = 0.119, OR =
4.54. On the other hand, the effect was reversed for participants with strong attitude (1
SD above the mean); participants who received prior record PTP were almost 5 times
more likely to vote guilty than participants with a strong attitude who received neutral
PTP, simple slope = 1.600, SE = 1.012, t = 1.580, p = 0.117, OR = 4.95.
Overall Results
Because this study examined so many variable, some clarification of study
findings, and how they align with hypotheses is necessary. Table 16 below details for
each hypothesized effect what was found and a brief interpretation of the finding. As the
table shows, more significant effects were found for guilt rating than verdict. Attitude
only showed a significant interaction with prior record PTP, but was in the expected
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direction. Additionally, instructions weakened the effects of resisting arrest PTP and
prior record PTP, but actually strengthened the effect of confession PTP.
Table 16. Chart of Hypothesized Effects and Significant Results.
Hypothesis
Effect on Guilt Rating?
Effect of PTP Information
Confession PTP resulted in higher
Confession
guilt ratings
Prior record PTP results in
Prior Record
marginally higher guilt ratings
Resisting Arrest
None
PTP x Attitude Interaction
Confession
None
Strong attitude increased effect of
Prior Record
PTP
Resisting Arrest
None
PTP x Admonition Interaction
Strong instructions strengthened
effect of PTP – Psychological
Confession
Reactance
Prior Record
None
Specific instructions strengthened
effect of PTP – Psychological
Resisting Arrest
Reactance, Ironic Process, or
Thought Suppression
PTP x Attitude x Admonition Interaction
Confession
None
Specific and strong instructions
Prior Record
weakened effect of PTP and attitude
Resisting Arrest
None

Effect on Verdict?
None
None
None
None
Strong attitude increased
effect of PTP
None
Similar to guilt rating effect
but marginally significant
None
None

None
None
None

Exploratory Analyses
Though some hypotheses were supported, only small proportions of total variance
in guilt ratings and verdicts were explained. Other variables, including participant
attitudes not examined in previous analyses, may explain these outcomes. According to
Finkel (1995), individual attitudes and knowledge influence legal decisions and provide
basic guidelines on the weighting of specific case facts. Though it was expected that
attitudes directly relevant to PTP information would determine whether PTP is used in
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determining guilt, other attitudes relevant to case evidence and information may also
determine guilt. Therefore, exploratory analyses using other attitude variables relevant to
the specific facts of the case were conducted.
In addition to the attitude questions relevant to the PTP information received,
participants provided a variety of attitudes that may be relevant to the specific case,
including whether a defendant should be required to testify, and whether illegal or
circumstantial evidence should be used in court. Furthermore, it has been argued that
simply learning that a person has been arrested for a crime may be biasing and may lead
people to believe the arrestee is guilty (Bruschke & Loges, 1999); as with PTP
information, however, learning that a person has been arrested would only be biasing if
an individual believes that police do not make mistakes and only arrest guilty people.
Therefore, attitudes about police or defendant behavior during arrest would also be
relevant to the current case, where all participants (including those in the neutral PTP
group) received a statement about the arrest prior to reading the court transcript.
Multiple linear regression was performed, regressing guilt rating onto attitude
questions about evidence, police behavior, and suspect behavior. Overall, the model was
significant, R2 = 0.07, F (7,343) = 3.42, p = 0.002 (see Table 17 for regression
coefficients). One predictor was significant; participants who more strongly believed that
police should be able to arrest people who “look suspicious” gave higher guilt ratings, β =
0.15, t = 2.77, p = 0.006. Additionally, participants who more strongly believed that
illegal evidence should be allowed in court gave marginally higher guilt ratings, β = 0.10,
t = 1.81, p = 0.07.
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These variables were also used in a logistic regression with verdict. Though
overall the model provided a poor fit for the data, χ2 (df = 343) = 440.38, p = 0.0003,
predicting only 55 percent of verdicts, three predictors were significant (see Table 17 for
regression coefficients). As with guilt rating, a belief that police should be able to arrest
“suspicious” people increased guilty verdicts. Participants who more strongly believed
circumstantial evidence should never be used to convict were 1.5 times less likely to find
the defendant guilty than participants with a neutral attitude. Finally, participants who
strongly believed upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police were 1.3 times
more likely to find the defendant guilty than participants with a neutral attitude.
Table 17. Regressions Using Evidence, Police Behavior, and Suspect Behavior Attitudes.
DV: Guilt Rating
DV: Verdict
Predictor
B
SE
β
t
B
SE
Wald
Constant
3.96 0.57
6.90 -0.94 1.04 -0.90
Allow Illegal Evidence
0.11 0.06 0.10 1.81+ 0.14 0.11 1.35
Allow Circumstantial Evidence -0.09 0.07 -0.07 -1.33 -0.45 0.13 -3.50**
Defendant Required to Testify 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.87
Arrest Suspicious People
0.18 0.07 0.15 2.77** 0.37 0.12 3.03**
Upstanding Citizens
0.09 0.06 0.08 1.40 0.26 0.11 2.38*
Police Overzealous
-0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.93 0.07 0.13 0.54
Police Abuse Power
0.08 0.09 0.05 0.96 -0.14 0.16 -0.86
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Another finding that should be further examined is explanations for verdict
selections and how verdict relates to guilt rating. Though guilt rating and verdict were
strongly correlated (r = 0.61), variables that significantly predicted guilt did not also
predict verdict, and vice versa. The guilt rating ranged from 1 to 7, with the endpoints
“Definitely Not Guilty” and “Definitely Guilty,” respectively. One would expect then,
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that participants selecting “7” on the guilt rating would also select “guilty”; the table
below (Table 18) shows that this is not the case.
Table 18. Frequencies (and Percentages) of Guilt Rating by Verdict.
Guilt Rating
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Not Guilty
0 (0.0%)
13 (100.0%)
53 (98.1%)
43 (93.5%)
57 (47.1%)
21 (18.9%)
1 (12.5%)
188 (53.3%)

Guilty
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (1.9%)
3 (6.5%)
64 (52.9%)
90 (81.1%)
7 (87.5%)
165 (46.7%)

Total
0
13
54
46
121
111
8
353

One possibility is that, as Finkel (1995) suggests, attitudes change the way one
considers the evidence, and alters the threshold one sets for guilt. Additionally,
participants who believe that the defendant is definitely or probably guilty, but still select
a not guilty verdict, may be responding to their own beliefs about justice, such as a belief
that it is better to free a guilty defendant than convict an innocent defendant. To test
these hypotheses, two additional logistic regressions were performed, regressing verdict
onto guilt rating, attitudes relating to justice issues (such as beliefs about the danger of
convicting the innocent and the importance of liberty), and attitudes relating to the
“threshold” for guilt (such as what to do if a person is “obviously guilty” or the meaning
of “reasonable doubt”). The first model provided good fit for the data, χ2 (df = 344) =
307.98, p = 0.92, correctly predicting 73.5 percent of verdicts; two predictors were
significant (see Table 19). Guilt rating was a strong predictor of verdict. Additionally,
participants who strongly believe that too many obviously guilty are acquitted were more
likely to vote guilty.
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Table 19. Predicting Guilt with Criminal Justice Attitudes.
Predictor
B
Constant
-0.46
Obviously Guilty
0.37
Reasonable Doubt
-0.17
Free Guilty v. Convict Innocent -0.17
Meaning of True Liberty
-0.01
Juries Use Evidence Only
0.07
Guilt Rating
1.81
ObGuilt x Guilt Rating
ReasDoubt x Guilt Rating
FreeGuilt x Guilt Rating
Liberty x Guilt Rating
JurEvidence x Guilt Rating
Notes. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Model 1
SE Wald
0.16 -2.93
0.16 2.29*
0.14 -1.22
0.14 -1.23
0.16 -0.06
0.14 0.48
0.20 8.96**

B
-0.45
0.29
-0.06
-0.17
0.03
-0.01
1.89
0.15
-0.32
0.03
-0.17
0.16

Model 2
SE
Wald
0.16 -2.78**
0.18 1.64+
0.15 -0.38
0.16 -1.07
0.17 0.16
0.16 -0.1
0.22 8.65**
0.22 0.67
0.18 -1.81+
0.18 0.14
0.19 -0.88
0.19 0.82

In the second model, interactions were created between each attitude and guilt
rating. Overall, the model provided good fit for the data, χ2 (df = 339) = 301.01, p = 0.93,
predicting 74.1 percent of verdicts. Guilt remained a significant predictor and attitude
toward “obviously guilty” was marginally significant (see Table 19). Additionally, the
interaction between “reasonable doubt” attitude and guilt rating was marginally
significant. Post-hoc probing (using Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2004a) revealed that,
though few groups convicted when their guilt rating was low, participants who placed
more burden of proof on the defendant (to prove innocent beyond a reasonable doubt)
convicted at a lower guilt rating than participants who placed less burden on the
defendant (see Figure 5 below for predicted values). For example, an individual who
assigned a guilt rating of 6, and who places more burden of proof on the defendant, has a
91.1 percent change of convicting, while an individual assigning a guilt rating of 6 who
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does not expect the defendant to prove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt has only a
77.9 percent chance of convicting.
Figure 10. Effect of Guilt Rating and Reasonable Doubt Attitude.

Probability of Convicting

g
n
it
c
i
v
n
o
C
f
o
y
ti
il
b
a
b
o
r
P

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilt Rating
Reasonable Doubt Attitude
More Burden on Defendant

Neutral

Less Burden on Defendant

CHAPTER EIGHT
DISCUSSION
The current study both advances our understanding of PTP effects and raises new
questions for further research. It was hypothesized that PTP information would only bias
participants who had strong beliefs that such information indicated guilt, and that jury
instructions would affect participants differently depending on their attitude and PTP
information received. This hypothesis was supported in part, but only among participants
receiving prior record PTP. That is, when participants did not believe a prior record
indicated guilt, receiving PTP information and standard jury instructions resulted in a
lower guilt rating, while among participants with a strong belief that a prior record
indicated guilt, receipt of PTP information and standard jury instructions increased guilt
rating. More specific jury instructions made PTP participants provide guilt ratings that
were more similar to neutral participants. The effect of these variables on dichotomous
verdicts was slightly different, but it was found that participants with a strong attitude
toward prior record were more likely to vote guilty in the presence of PTP and
participants who did not believe prior record indicated guilt were less likely to vote guilty
in the presence of PTP.
These patterns differ slightly from what was hypothesized. Instructions were
expected to affect verdicts among participants with weaker attitudes, and not participants
with strong attitudes. Instead, specific and strong instructions served to weaken the
84

effects of PTP among both participants with weak and strong attitudes, making their
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guilt ratings similar to those receiving neutral PTP. Because there did not appear to be a
different pattern for low and high attitude participants, belief perseverance is not a good
explanation for these results. Additionally, psychological reactivity is also probably not
occurring, because if it were, stronger instructions would have increased guilt ratings.
Among the other two PTP groups, confession, and resisting arrest, no three-way
interactions were observed, but some significant effects were uncovered. Knowledge of a
confession resulted in higher guilt ratings, though this information alone was not enough
to affect dichotomous verdicts. Additionally, jury instructions affected guilt rating
among participants receiving confession or resisting arrest PTP, but not in the same way
as it did among participants receiving prior record PTP. That is, instructions that
specifically addressed PTP led to increases in guilt ratings, and also marginally increased
guilty verdicts when confession PTP was used. Once again, because attitudes did not
play a role, belief perseverance is probably not the culprit. Thought suppression or ironic
processes may still explain these results, but psychological reactivity may also be a
possibility, since specific instructions to ignore such information strengthened their
effects. Finally, when resisting arrest PTP was used, participants with a stronger attitude
that resisting arrest implied guilt assigned higher guilt ratings; this effect was not reduced
by jury instructions to ignore outside information, and specific instructions strengthened
the effect of PTP on guilt rating.
Many PTP researchers have hypothesized that certain PTP content will be more
biasing than other content. Otto, Penrod, and Dexter (1994), for instance, compared

different types of PTP information, including information on the defendant’s negative
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character, weak inadmissible evidence, strong inadmissible evidence, and information on
the defendant’s socioeconomic status, and found that negative character information had
the strongest effect on verdict. Additionally, studies have shown that participants
receiving confession information (DeLuca, 1979) and prior record information
(Hvistendahl, 1979) show more bias toward guilt than participants receiving neutral
information. It may be that some information is inherently more biasing than other
information. Additionally, individuals may respond differently to instructions to ignore
certain pieces of information, showing the ability to ignore some information when asked
and, at other times, being more likely to use certain information even when it should be
ignored. More research is needed to explore this possibility. One method that has not
been used would be to have participants read more than one type of PTP content and rate
how damaging certain information is comparatively.
Variation in attitudes of participants may also explain why certain information
appears more biasing. Though participants were randomly assigned to PTP and jury
instruction conditions, attitudes were measured after these assignments had already been
made. Measuring attitudes beforehand, and stratifying assignment to groups based on
attitude would guarantee that participants with low, mean, and high attitudes were
distributed equally across conditions. This method may make interactions with attitude
easier to detect. Future research should include this additional step, which would help to
illuminate whether certain information is more biasing or whether participant attitudes
explain these different results.

Despite the fact that key hypotheses were not supported, this study provides
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more evidence for the biasing effects of PTP. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that PTP is not always biasing, and that some studies do not find PTP effects, or may
even find the opposite effect – that PTP reduces bias toward guilt. Type of case and
amount of PTP may explain differences in results compared to other studies of PTP. As
previously discussed, most PTP studies use homicide or sexual assault cases, which use
different types of evidence; these cases may also be considered more sensational by the
public and may garner more attention, both in the amount of media coverage of the event
as well as attention to the media information by consumers. Additionally, this study used
one article with only one sentence that introduced the biasing information; many other
studies of PTP either use more articles or more biasing information within a single
article. Bruschke and Loges (1999) found, in an analysis of 134 federal first-degree
murder cases that about 46 percent received no publicity, and 50 percent received
between 1 and 31 articles. Though the number of articles can range much higher than
that, with one case in their study being covered in 141 articles, studies on cases receiving
small to moderate amounts of PTP may provide results that are more applicable to real
cases.
According to Finkel (1995), however, different results may be due to more than
crime of which the defendant was accused or amount of PTP. He argues that the story
potential jurors form to explain the events, and their interpretations of individual case
facts, will determine the outcome, meaning effects would be expected to vary for
different individual cases. Additionally, the information used to generate a story can

come from a variety of places, including pre-existing attitudes, case facts heard in
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court, and extralegal information from sources like PTP. Even if jurors do not come into
the courtroom with a pre-developed story, they may use information heard beforehand to
shape the story they develop while in court to create a cohesive account of the events and
to attribute blame.
It is difficult to determine how PTP information was used, however, because
participants did not respond to any questions about trial evidence or how they arrived at
their verdict. This information may provide insight into how, and if, participants used
outside information, such as PTP or attitudes, to understand the case and arrive at an
outcome. Because participants were already completing an attitude questionnaire and
reading a trial transcript, a measure of responses to evidence was not included in the
present study, to reduce the possibility of participant fatigue. One way to reduce this
fatigue would have been to expose participants to the PTP and/or given the attitude
measure at a different time. Researchers should consider including measures of reactions
to the trial, either through an interview or standardized questionnaire, and may also wish
to conduct studies over two or more sessions, to lessen the chance for fatigue and more
accurately reflect real-life exposure to PTP.
When a meta-analysis exists on a topic, many researchers (e.g., Chrzanowski,
2006) will compare their results to those obtained by the meta-analysis. This can help to
demonstrate whether current findings are in-line with past research on a topic. In the
meta-analysis (Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), I found that effects of PTP obtained
after presentation of trial evidence were significantly smaller than effects of PTP obtained

prior to presentation of trial evidence. Participants in the current study did not provide
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verdict preferences prior to presentation of the trial, but it would be expected that effects
of PTP would have been stronger prior to trial presentation because at that point in time,
participants have less information upon which to base their decisions. Additionally,
posttrial effects, though smaller than pretrial effects, were still significant. The metaanalysis, however, was unable to examine the influence of individual difference variables
that may explain why some studies find significant effects of PTP while others do not.
The current study offers some evidence that individual attitudes can explain variability in
study findings.
The meta-analysis also showed an effect of crime, with studies using either sex
offenses or non-violent crimes finding smaller effects, and studies using homicides or
other violent crimes finding larger effects. As stated previously, however, few studies
included in the meta-analysis used an assault trial, as was used in the current study. This
type of crime is less sensational than a homicide trial or certain other violent crimes, and
verdicts in less sensational cases may be less affected by PTP. Finally, the meta-analysis
did not find any significant change in PTP effects when a judicial admonition was used,
but variations in wording, strength, and method of presentation of the admonition used in
different studies may also have an effect.
In addition to this study’s findings on PTP, the current study also provides some
evidence that attitudes may explain different thresholds for guilt. Specifically, participant
attitudes on the meaning of “reasonable doubt” influenced how certain the participant
needed to be of guilt before convicting. These findings are only exploratory, however, so

additional research is needed to verify these findings. Such studies could use similar
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methodologies as studies of commonsense justice. These studies begin with a particular
case, and manipulate different case facts to determine their effect on the outcome. For
example, Finkel (1995) discusses felony murder, a charge allowed in certain US states.
In felony murder cases, the defendant can be charged with the murder of anyone who
died while the defendant was committing a crime, whether the murder was caused by the
defendant (such as the defendant shot and killed a bank teller while robbing the bank) or
was caused by something else (the bank teller had a heart attack while the defendant was
robbing the bank). Though in states that allow felony murder charges, jurors would be
expected to charge the defendant with murder even in the “heart attack” scenario, Finkel
found that manipulating how responsible the defendant was for the victim’s death
affected juror verdicts. Researchers may be able to explore jurors’ threshold for guilt by
using a similar method as Finkel and other commonsense justice researchers, while
including a measure of relevant attitudes and a continuous guilt rating in addition to
verdict. This would help to determine whether different thresholds are the result of case
information, attitudes, or some combination of both.
Study Limitations
Many of the results that were expected to be significant were not found in the
current study. One possibility is lack of power. Power analysis was conducted on the
smallest expected effects for a continuous dependent variable, but not for a dichotomous
dependent variable, meaning the logistic regression analyses may have been
underpowered. Another possibility is that the theories used in the current study failed to

correctly predict results. PTP research has been criticized before as atheoretical
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(Bruschke & Loges, 2004), and only recently have researchers begun to use theory to
inform hypotheses. Because attitude theory has been used in other studies of juror
decision-making (Devine et al., 2001), it seemed only natural to include attitude theory in
PTP research. Obviously, additional research is needed to generate or modify theory so
that it can properly predict PTP effects.
Attitude theory could also be more fully tested in the context of PTP research by
including additional questions on responses to the case and its evidence; both
Chrzanowski (2006) and Honess, Charman, and Levi (2003) included such questions in
their studies. For instance, the expectancy-value model was utilized in the current study
to predict how pre-existing attitudes would interact with PTP information. This model
states, however, that as more information is obtained about an attitude target, in this case,
the defendant, that information will be evaluated (in terms of good-bad, for instance) and
a strength will be assigned to that belief. Information about the attitude target includes
not only PTP, but the case evidence. Asking jurors to respond to attitude questions about
different pieces of evidence, or having them respond to open-ended questions about how
they arrived at their verdict, would allow us to explore how attitudes about the defendant
were formed, either based on previous attitudes or entirely new attitudes formed on-line,
and how they combined to determine verdict preference. Some research suggests that
attitudes formed on-line are stronger than memory-based attitudes (Bizer, Tormala,
Rucker, & Petty, 2006), meaning the attitudes participants formed while examining case
evidence may have a stronger influence on verdict preference than pre-existing attitudes.

Similarly, another limitation to the current study is that it did not include any
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questions that would relate to the victim or his behavior. In this particular case, the
victim’s eyewitness identification was questioned because he had not been wearing his
glasses at the time of the attack. Participant attitudes toward eyewitness testimony and its
accuracy may explain why some participants chose to convict and others did not.
Similarly, little information was included about the victim in the PTP, but in some cases,
PTP may routinely contain information about the victim. For example, in sexual assault
cases, the media is generally free to publish information about the victim (Benedict,
1993), such as past sexual history, that would typically be inadmissible in court (National
Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse, 2010). Few studies have examined how victim
information presented in the media influences verdicts.
One exception is Chrzanowski (2006), who studied a sexual assault case in
California, and compared a non-experimental group that had been exposed to PTP on
their own to an experimental group assigned to view PTP. Non-experimental participants
completed questionnaires to determine how much information they recalled viewing and
whether that information was negative toward the defendants, neutral, or negative toward
the victim. The experimental group of participants, from a different location, was
randomly assigned to view PTP information that was negative toward the defendants,
neutral, or negative toward the victim. Participants who were exposed to PTP that was
negative toward the victim provided higher ratings of innocence than participants
exposed to PTP that was negative toward the defendants. The effect was stronger in the
non-experimental group.

No manipulation checks were performed to confirm whether participants
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attended to and understood the pretrial publicity or jury instructions. Though many
studies on PTP do not include such manipulation checks, additional questions to probe
participant memory or comprehension of this information may help to explain results
obtained, including nonsignificant results. Another limitation is that, in order to fully test
hypotheses in the current design, many statistical tests were performed. Most of these
tests were planned and specific hypotheses were generated beforehand, but because
alpha-rates were not adjusted, some significant results, particularly the unexpected
significant results, could have been obtained merely by chance alone. Additionally, the
unplanned exploratory analyses may have also capitalized on chance and inflated
experiment-wise error. Additional research is needed to confirm these results.
The current study was also conducted using undergraduate participants
completing the study on their own in a lab setting. Because few studies have examined
the effect of specific attitudes and their interaction with PTP information and jury
instructions, this study was considered a necessary first step to determine if larger, more
realistic studies are necessary. The obvious next step would be to use participants drawn
from the community or jury records, and to use more realistic trial materials, such as a
recorded trial or mock trial. Additionally, future research should include deliberation and
group verdicts. Including group decision making, however, would likely require different
methods and/or statistical analysis. That is, attitudes and degree of exposure to PTP
would be expected to vary across actual juries, meaning that assigning participants
similar in attitude and exposure would artificially reduce differences among individual

jury members, and create a more homogenous group that may arrive at different
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conclusions than a more heterogeneous group. Of course, allowing attitudes and degree
of PTP exposure to freely vary would make analysis of group verdicts using conventional
techniques difficult. PTP researchers may wish to use a methodology and analysis
technique that takes into account group member differences and interactions, such as
social network analysis.
Social network analysis provides not only theory and methods to understand the
interaction between individuals and groups, but also specific analysis techniques and
software to model these complex interactions (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Specifically, a
network is made up of two or more actors who are connected in some way; the type and
strength of connections between actors can vary (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994).
Though social network analysis was developed to examine linkages between parties, and
relationships between number of linkages and social influence, Pattison (1994) argues
that social network analysis could also be used in social cognitive research, such as
research on attitude change. That is, social network analysis could be used to understand
the process by which one or more individuals in a network exert influence over other
individuals, resulting in attitude change.
Additionally, social network analysis could be used to understand information
sharing in juries. Shared information has a strong influence on jury outcomes (Kerr &
Tindale, 2004). Information shared by the members of the group will be more likely to
be used than information held by only a few members of the group. In the case of PTP,
unless a case received a great deal of publicity, it is reasonable to assume such

information would not be shared by all group members. Even with a great deal of

95

publicity, different group members may be aware of different pieces of information, and
there may be little overlap in knowledge. Furthermore, PTP information discussed
during deliberation may or may not have an effect; it could be that participants exposed
to PTP communicate that information with un-exposed jurors, causing a diffusion of
treatment, or it could be that non-exposed jurors caution exposed jurors that the
information being discussed is not from the trial (Bruschke & Loges, 1999), thereby
nullifying any source monitoring errors.
There is likely, however, to be variation in individual jurors’ level of influence.
An influential jury member who discusses biasing PTP information may have a stronger
effect on the other jury members than a less influential jury member with the same
information, and so the propensity to use unshared information may vary by jury
influence. Combining such research with social network analysis would allow
researchers to take into account different levels of influence within the jury. In addition,
such research could examine varying degrees of jury exposure, comparing juries where
few members saw PTP to juries where the majority of members saw PTP; this would
allow researchers to determine a dosage effect and could aid in jury selection, as well as
in appeals on the basis of PTP.
Another potential future direction is to examine the interaction of PTP with cases
involving additional instructions or defenses. For example, cases in which the defendant
is eligible for the death penalty usually include the process of death qualification, in
which potential jurors are questioned about their beliefs on the death penalty, and

individuals with moral objections to the death penalty are excluded. Research has

96

already found that death qualification can bias a jury toward conviction. Butler (2007)
examined the interaction between PTP and death qualification, and found that deathqualified participants were more likely to attend to and remember PTP, which could lead
to additional bias. Researchers may wish to analyze the interactive effects of PTP in
other situations, such as in insanity trials, where jurors are also often hesitant to acquit.

CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS AND GOING FORWARD
For years, there has been debate in the fields of psychology, communication, and
law, as well as other related fields, on what should be done to deal with pretrial publicity
effects. Unfortunately, there is not necessarily agreement in the field that PTP biases
verdicts, mainly because of the variation in study results (Bruschke & Loges, 2004).
Reviews of the literature, and studies like this one, suggest that PTP does not always bias
verdicts, but in certain cases, and with certain jurors, such information can be biasing.
Some potential moderating variables, such as case strength or content of PTP, have been
explored (e.g., Locatelli, Fulero, & Kluwe, 2011), but more guidance is needed for such
results to be useful for legal professionals.
This study is one attempt to explain why PTP may be biasing for some jurors. It
may not be the information alone, but the pre-existing attitude of the juror, that interacts
with the case and PTP information. Though additional work is needed to clarify the
wording of instructions to correct for these effects, these results give lawyers and judges
some information as to when PTP may bias jurors, and in how to uncover such bias.
Unfortunately, knowledge is not enough.
Why Knowledge is Not Enough
Even if legal professionals agreed that these and similar findings are valid and
that PTP may be a cause for concern, using such results to change practice is not
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necessarily straightforward. Though one could argue that legal professionals simply
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do not understand psychological research well enough to apply these findings, the issue
goes deeper than lack of understanding. Even the most capable and knowledgeable of
psychological researchers may struggle with applying psychological research findings to
their lives, let alone to an organization as complex as our legal system. It is not always
clear how to put research findings into practice, and there are many barriers that may
hinder such application. As Rogers (2003) points out, “Many technologists believe that
advantageous innovations will sell themselves, that the obvious benefits of a new idea
will be widely realized by potential adopters, and that the innovation will diffuse rapidly.
Seldom is this the case” (p. 7).
Some researchers and organizations have attempted to introduce innovations in
courtrooms. These examples show that more direction is needed than simply informing
courtrooms of beneficial innovations. Though none of these innovations targeted PTP
specifically, some target jury procedures that could be useful in cases involving PTP. For
example, Sand and Reiss (1985) discuss seven experiments conducted in the District
Courts of the Second Circuit. These experiments were planned by a committee
established as part of the Second Circuit Judicial Conference and appointed by the Chief
Judge for the Second Circuit. Second Circuit courtrooms were contacted and invited to
adopt one or more procedures: (1) permitting attorneys to question potential jurors during
voir dire, (2) allowing individual questioning of potential jurors in the judge’s chambers,
(3) instructing jurors before trial, (4) allowing jurors to ask questions, (5) allowing jurors
to take notes, (6) providing a written copy of the charges to jurors in the deliberation

room, and (7) providing jurors with a tape recording of the charges in the deliberation
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room. Courts were provided with detailed instructions on implementing the changes as
well as measures to collect data on the effects of these innovations. Reactions for the
seven innovations were generally positive, and the authors encouraged future
experimentation with courtroom innovations.
Introducing innovations to a legal setting involves examining the process of
implementation throughout, to assess any barriers or challenges to implementation.
Whether an innovation is implemented as planned can influence the outcome, and
differences in implementation may explain why a program “works” in one setting but
does not in another. Gondolf (2010) discusses two evaluations of experimental programs
targeting batterers, one an experimental design that failed to find expected differences,
and the other, originally designed as an experiment, that was changed to a phased
implementation. Gondolf uses these examples to caution against the over-dependence on
experimental designs, and, more importantly, to encourage researchers using
experimental designs to study court innovations to examine factors related to
implementation, adverse events, and unintended consequences. In fact, lessons learned
from these and other implementation projects could be useful in planning implementation
research on innovations for PTP and juror bias.
One organization that regularly works with courts to develop and implement
innovations is the Center for Court Innovation. Founded in the mid-1990s, the Center is
made up of experts in law and social sciences, such as social work and psychology, who
work together to introduce innovations to New York courtrooms (Center for Court

Innovation, 2011). Many of the projects within the Center involve “problem-solving
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justice”, in which the goal of the court is to solve the underlying problems of the
defendant, victim, and community in order to prevent future crime (Berman & Feinblatt,
2003). The Center takes a hands-on approach with the courts targeted for innovations,
and collects data throughout to inform the process and demonstrate program success.
Recently, the Center for Court Innovation published a report detailing lessons
learned from various implementation projects (Cissner & Farole, 2009). These lessons
are: (1) have a shared vision and identify program goals, (2) identify quantifiable
objectives, (3) have a plan on how to collect data, (4) formalize the program model, (5)
be strategic about when and how to engage stakeholders in the planning process, (6) think
about how to facilitate buy-in from line staff, (7) be realistic, (8) beware the temptation to
overestimate caseload volume, (9) adapt the program in response to early implementation
experience, (10) designate a project director, and (11) find political champions.
Similarly, Visher, Newmark, and Harrell (2007) identified barriers to the
implementation of a program for domestic violence offenders and victims. The program,
known as the Judicial Oversight Demonstration, was designed to increase oversight on
the offenders, ensure uniform responses to offenders, and coordinate services for victims
and other affected parties, such as children of the victim. Though the program led to
positive changes at the demonstration sites, five “challenges” to implementation were
identified: (1) gaps in knowledge about the operations of other service partners, (2)
unanticipated impact on workload of partner agencies, (3) delays caused by county and

state rules on new positions, (4) lack of systems to coordinate data-sharing, and (5)
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difficulty integrating community-based victim services into justice agencies.
Following these lessons, by setting clear goals, establishing leadership to direct
operations, and formalizing communication and data-sharing, may prevent some issues
with implementation from interfering with the innovation. Even so, researchers may still
encounter a variety of barriers, and guidance on planning innovations to accommodate
such barriers would maximize program success, which may help to persuade the courts to
be involved in more partnerships with researchers in the future.
There is no framework or theory on the barriers to applying research evidence in a
legal setting, but researchers in health care settings provide some guidance that may be
applicable. That is, researchers in health care settings are experiencing similar
difficulties with translating their findings into practice. Many of these researchers argue
that the issue is lack of understanding by providers and other medical professionals, but
the bigger issue is that changing practice is a slow process (Rogers, 2003), involving
many variables, such as the organization’s resources, involvement by leadership, and
mechanisms for feedback (Greenhalgh, Robert, MacFarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004;
Rycroft-Malone et al., 2002). These issues explain why a well-designed, empirically
validated program may not have the same results when introduced in a particular setting.
They have tackled these issues by developing a different kind of research, which occurs
after clinical research but before changed practice: implementation research.
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Background on Implementation Science
Implementation science and implementation research address the issues
associated with applying research findings in practice. Specifically, implementation
researchers place their main focus on examining the barriers and facilitators to
implementation and in many cases, making changes to address those issues (Werner,
2004). These changes may be within the system to remove barriers or introduce
facilitators; alternatively, they may make changes to the program to allow it to work with
pre-existing structures and processes, by working to identify what pieces of the
intervention that are vital to program success and what components that can be
customized to fit into a certain environment. Though implementation research uses its
own terminology and study designs, psychological researchers will be able to understand
some of the underlying theory and components of these models and frameworks, in part
because many are based on psychological theories, such as theories of behavior change
(Bero et al., 1998).
In addition, many theories are based on Rogers’s diffusion of innovations model
(Glasgow, 2007), which grew out of Rogers’s research on diffusion of agricultural
innovations and today can be used to explain a variety of innovations, from medical
treatments to computers. According to Rogers (2003), making an innovation part of
regular practice is a phased process, in which individuals or organizations learn about the
innovation (knowledge), evaluate the innovation (persuasion), decide whether to adopt or
reject the innovation (decision), adopt the innovation (implementation), and seek
evidence to reinforce their decision (confirmation). Different people will adopt

innovations at different stages; some will be “early adopters”, who will evaluate and
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adopt an innovation when it is very new, and others will wait for more evidence and
advice from others before implementation. Furthermore, characteristics of the
innovation, such as its relative advantage, complexity, and compatibility with current
practice, will influence whether an innovation “catches on.”
One framework that is frequently used by implementation researchers is PARIHS
(Promoting Action on Research Implementation in Health Services), which states that
implementation is a function of three general categories: (1) evidence, or the support for
the effectiveness of an intervention or practice, including research evidence, experience
of parties within the system, and local data; (2) context, which includes the organization’s
readiness for change, culture, leadership, resources, and evaluation and feedback systems;
and (3) facilitation, such as individuals who have been appointed to help or enable others
to change their practice (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2002; Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004). Any
attempt to implement research evidence into practice should take these three categories
into account, recognizing that any of these three categories, even evidence to support the
intervention, is likely to vary by site. Because PARIHS was designed to be used in health
care settings, many terms are specific to the delivery of patient care. The PARIHS
model, however, could be useful in understanding implementation in a variety of
systems, and can be used when planning an implementation intervention (Kitson et al.,
2008) or to evaluate an intervention that has already been implemented (Helfrich et al.,
2010).

RE-AIM is another potential framework that could be adopted by legal
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researchers. RE-AIM stands for: (1) Reach, the proportion of people or organizations
that would be able to apply the intervention; (2) Effectiveness, how well the intervention
improves a given outcome; (3) Adoption, the proportion of eligible people or
organizations that choose to implement the practice or intervention; (4) Implementation,
the degree to which an intervention is delivered as it was intended; and (5) Maintenance,
the sustainability of a practice or intervention (Glasgow, 2003). Like PARIHS, RE-AIM
is often applied in health care settings; PARIHS, however, identifies organizational
factors influencing implementation, while RE-AIM is applicable to both organizations
and individuals in understanding the factors that affect successful implementation
(Glasgow, 2007). For example, maintenance could refer to an organization’s ability to
maintain a changed practice, but it could also refer to an individual’s ability to continue
participating in a program. The developers of RE-AIM suggest its use in designing an
implementation, because it encourages individuals to consider more than the empirical
evidence for a given intervention (effectiveness), such as factors that impact who may
benefit from the intervention (Glasgow, Vogt, & Boles, 1999).
Another model, developed through a systematic review of 495 sources about
interventions in health care settings, is a complex account of how innovations are
disseminated, diffused, and implemented, and the linkages between the service
organization and other systems (Greenhalgh et al., 2004). Though the authors note that
their model is for use as a “memory aide for considering the different aspects of a
complex situation and their many interactions” (p. 594), rather than a tool for planning

innovations, the model identifies many factors that should be taken into account when
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prescribing changes in complex systems. Specifically, aside from noting the importance
of strong communication, and discussion of meaning and mission between the change
agency and the target agency, Greenhalgh et al.’s model includes several characteristics
of the innovation itself that would influence how easily it is implemented, which reflect
attributes identified by Rogers (2003). Specifically, the innovation should be clearly
effective and cost-effective; compatible with organizational norms and practices; simple
to use; able to be experimented with, adopted in stages, or tailored; and result in
observable changes.
Finally, Lukas and colleagues (2007) developed an organizational model of
transformation based on interviews conducted as part of a program evaluation on
Pursuing Perfection, a program designed to introduce dramatic changes to health care.
Though the models previously discussed all remark that outside forces (from beyond the
organization of interest) are at play, Lukas et al.’s model notes that the impetus to
changed practice often comes from outside the organization through policy or public
pressure. Leadership within the organization is placed at the top of the model, and
promotes changes throughout the organization. Pressure from outside and activity by
leadership leads to the development of improvement initiatives, which transform the
organization by (1) improving operations, (2) connecting multidisciplinary staff so they
can work together to solve a tangible, important problem, and (3) building momentum for
future innovations. This model also notes the importance of context, including
organizational mission, culture, resources, and current practice.

Though many of the frameworks, theories, and models just discussed were
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designed to be applied to health care settings, the basic components can be applied to a
variety of situations, such as the legal system. Additionally, health care settings and legal
settings are similar in complexity and resource limitations. Unlike health care settings,
however, professionals in legal systems may not have as much opportunity to interact
with professionals in other departments or locations. Therefore, some implementation
tactics that are useful in health care settings, such as local opinion leaders who educate
other practitioners and encourage buy-in, may not translate to legal settings. Even so,
there may be ways for PTP researchers and psychologists to bridge the gap, and conduct
research and interventions that could assist legal professionals in applying empirical
evidence.
Based on these theories, models, and frameworks, there are several important
issues to consider when planning implementation of an intervention for the legal system.
Organizational readiness for change is an important consideration for making changes
within the legal system; because of the strength of precedent in directing practice, anyone
attempting to make changes within the legal system should carefully assess readiness for
change, which may vary depending on the type of change being suggested (Kitson et al.,
1998). Greenhalgh and colleagues (2004) note that a receptive context should have: (1)
leadership and vision, (2) good managerial relations, (3) a risk-taking climate, (4) clear
goals and priorities, and (5) high-quality data capture. Ensuring that these elements are
sufficient for the proposed change will maximize the adoption and effectiveness of the
intervention.

Limited resources, including financial, time, and human resources, should also
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be taken into account. Any suggestions for change should not require large changes in
resource allocation, but should be feasible using current resources. In this case,
suggesting minor changes to instruction wording or additional discussion of jury
instructions may be manageable by most courts; suggesting greater use of change of
venue or change of venire would be difficult, if not impossible, for many courts. If
additional physical or human resources are necessary, researchers should consider
applying for outside funding.
Similarly, any suggestions for changed practice should compliment current
practice and not require a substantial change in time commitment. Psychological
researchers could work on developing accessible tools, along with clear advice on when
to use these tools, that could be adopted by court officials or lawyers. For example,
because attitudes were found to have an influence on use of PTP information, a bank of
attitude questions that could be used for a written measure or verbal questioning, could
supplement current voir dire procedures and, provided clear guidance is given on how to
use the results, may help these procedures to uncover more useful information.
Influence from outside of the organization and attention from leadership are also
essential in encouraging and planning innovations in the legal system. Gaining the
support from and working through oversight agencies may provide the additional push
needed to get meaningful changes into practice. For example, in the seven experiments
discussed by Sand and Reiss (1985), the invitation and instructions came from leadership
in their circuit; for this reason, judges may have been more willing to participate and may

have seen these suggested changes as more significant and justified. Strong

108

leadership is also important to organize communication and data-sharing among
individuals or organizations, which will help to prevent delays or misunderstandings.
An additional issue to consider is to recognize the expertise of legal professionals
when making suggestions for improvement, particularly if a psychological researcher is
organizing the implementation trial. Psychologists have a strong understanding of human
cognition and behavior, which is necessary to uncover bias. At the same time, lawyers
understand the law better than psychologists, and as such, are better equipped to question
potential jurors in ways that are legally permissible. Though in the famous O.J. Simpson
homicide trial, trial consultants were appalled that prosecutor Marcia Clark chose to
ignore her jury expert’s advice to keep African-American women off the jury, deciding
instead to purposefully select African-American women to serve on the jury (Linder,
2011), Clark may have also been concerned about violating statutes that prevent lawyers
from targeting African-Americans for exclusion (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986). That is,
evidence that she was purposefully excluding African-American women from serving
could have been challenged by the defense; if the judge agreed that the prosecution was
targeting certain individuals, and decided to seat these individuals on the jury despite the
prosecution’s request that they be excluded, these jurors could have begun hearing the
trial believing the prosecutor was “against them.” Therefore, Clark’s decision may have
been strategic, to get these individuals to believe she was “on their side”, though, focus
groups with African-American women suggest that jurors’ opinion of her may not have
been positive (Linder, 2011).
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Bridging the Gap
It is important to keep in mind that any proposed changes to a system as large and
complex as our legal system should work with the pre-existing structures and correct the
problem with the smallest change in practice possible. More research is needed to
determine whether a change is feasible, and these studies should take place in actual legal
settings. After lab studies showing whether a change affects the outcome, the next step is
to conduct studies with the cooperation of a small number of courtrooms.
As part of these small studies, data should be collected on not only the outcome,
but any barriers, facilitators, and unintended consequences (both positive and negative).
These results would provide information on how feasible it is to implement this change
into practice, and direction on how to alter the program or practice in a particular setting
so that it works with, not against, current practice. As suggested by Cissner and Farole
(2011), innovations should be designed in such a way to allow changes to be made when
needed, by providing direction on how the practice could be changed if needed and
providing a mechanism for feedback. Allowing for tailoring should not only make legal
professionals more open to implementing the changes; it will also help to allay any
concerns about adverse outcomes that could lead to mistrials or appeals.
Working Together to Move Forward
For many years, psychological researchers have been examining the legal setting
and legal professionals, and providing evidence on issues with current practice. From
Sigmund Freud telling Austrian judges that their unconscious processes may bias their
decisions (Bersoff, 1986) to criticism of jury selection in death penalty cases (Lynch,

2009), there are countless examples of psychologists and experts from related fields
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insisting that something needs to change with little guidance on what to do instead or,
when changes are suggested, how to merge them with current practice. There are a few
cases where these experts have stepped in, explained the program in language legal
professionals can understand, and provided specific instructions and assistance on
making the change work in a particular setting. If researchers want to effect real change
in the legal system, we must be willing to meet the legal system halfway, and take this
hands-on approach more frequently. By showing that we understand the burdens placed
on legal professionals, or at the very least, making efforts to learn about the processes
that may hinder improvements to practice, we will be able to work together to change
practice for the better.

APPENDIX A:
REVIEW OF WITNESS CHARACTERISTIC EFFECTS

111

112
Some PTP researchers have examined characteristics of the crime. The
heinousness of the description has been found to affect verdicts. Though they did not
compare two different crimes, Hoiberg and Stires (1973) manipulated whether the PTP
contained a detailed description of a murder-rape or gave a short description of the
murder without mentioning the rape. All participants learned about the sexual nature of
the crime at the trial, but female participants who received the detailed description in PTP
rated the defendant as more guilty after the trial.
Deitz and Sissman (1984), in addition to questioning respondents about a specific
case, asked various questions about crime in general. Participants rated the seriousness
of various crimes and estimated the number of defendants accused of each crime that
were actually guilty. Though there were no differences in estimates across the different
crimes, there were differences in the perceived seriousness of crimes on a scale of 1 to
10. Speeding and shoplifting received the lowest ratings. Credit card theft, possession of
illegal drugs, and burglary received ratings just above the scale midpoint. The most
serious crimes were generally crimes against people, such as kidnapping, rape, and
murder. The one exception was distribution of cocaine.
It is likely that different crimes have different effects on reactions to defendants
because of the emotions produced by such crimes. According to Ajzen and Sexton
(1999) affective responses are, for the most part, independent from the cognitive elements
involved in forming an attitude. These responses, however, can influence cognition in
certain situations. For instance, the affective-primacy hypothesis states that affect
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influences evaluations of novel stimuli if the person is unaware of the change in or source
of the affect.
Baumeister, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) differentiate between affect and emotions.
Affect is an automatic, predominantly unconscious reaction that guides behavior.
Emotion is the more deliberate, conscious experience, which occurs more slowly and is
less helpful in guiding behavior. One could think of the latter as what non-psychologists
mean when they discuss emotion, whereas the former is more similar to mood. Certain
crimes may affect decision making by eliciting sudden reactions. The person may not
know the cause of his or her affect or mood, and may attribute it to something else
(Gasper & Isbell, 2007), such as the defendant. This may then cause him or her to
evaluate the defendant more negatively and as more likely to be guilty.
In addition, affect can influence the type of information seen as relevant (Gasper
& Isbell, 2007), so that when a person is in a negative mood, he or she is more able to
remember negative information. This would mean that participants receiving a crime that
elicits a more negative mood would be more likely to recall negative PTP information,
and therefore, more likely to use such information. Though participants with strong
attitudes toward a given piece of information would likely remember, and use, such
information regardless of mood, participants with weaker attitudes may also be likely to
use such information when in a negative mood.
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This study is about decision making in a court case. It is being conducted by Sara M.
House for a dissertation under the supervision of Linda Heath in the Department of
Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.
You are being asked to participate because you are eligible for jury service. You must be
at least 18 years of age to participate.
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:
 Read an abbreviated trial transcript.
 Render a verdict and answer questions about your reactions to the case.
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those
experienced in everyday life. There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but
the results will be helpful in understanding reactions to trials.
Your results will be completely confidential. Your name will not be attached to any
materials, and only the researcher will have access to the data.
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not
have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any
question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Sara M. House
at shouse1@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Linda Heath, at lheath@luc.edu.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.
By completing the survey you are agreeing to participate in the research.
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You have been participating in a study on jury decision making. The purpose of this
study is to find a case of moderate strength for use in future research.
You received one of six versions of the case, each containing different combinations of
evidence. In addition, some of you received a case where the victim was a middle-aged
man, and some of you received a case where the victim was an elderly woman. It is
expected that participants reading a case with an elderly female victim will experience
more negative emotion. Finally, some of you completed this study online, and some of
you completed the study in a classroom; the purpose is to determine if the way in which
you completed the study affects your reactions to the case.
This research is ongoing, so please do not discuss the study with anyone. If you have any
questions or would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact Sara
House at shouse1@luc.edu.
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Predictor
Constant
Location
Overall Version
Version dummy 1
Version dummy 2
Version dummy 3
Version dummy 4
Version dummy 5

Victim
Overall Location X Version

B
-1.386
0.000

SE
0.791
1.118

0.539
0.000
0.405
1.386
0.000

1.049
1.118
1.041
1.012
1.118

Wald df
3.075 1
0.000 1
3.178 5
0.264
0.000
0.152
1.875
0.000

1
1
1
1
1

p
0.080
1.000
0.673
0.608
1.000
0.697
0.171
1.000

0.981

1.021

0.924
7.520

1
5

0.337
0.185

Loc X Version dummy 1
Loc X Version dummy 2
Loc X Version dummy 3
Loc X Version dummy 4
Loc X Version dummy 5

-1.551
1.792
0.644
-1.099
1.386

1.678
1.514
1.432
1.522
1.508

0.853
1.401
0.202
0.521
0.845

1
1
1
1
1

0.356
0.237
0.653
0.470
0.358

Vic X Version dummy 1
Vic X Version dummy 2
Vic X Version dummy 3
Vic X Version dummy 4
Vic X Version dummy 5

-1.520
-38.466
-1.386
-2.367
1.792

1.464
67110000.0
1.458
1.438
1.514

1.683

0.678
11.896

1
5

0.410
0.036

2.937
36.962
1.281
3.312
-3.584

2.377
67110000.0
2.176
2.218
2.365

1.526
0.000
0.346
2.230
2.295

1
1
1
1
1

0.217
1.000
0.556
0.135
0.130

Overall Victim X Version

Victim X Location
Overall Victim X Location X Version
Vic X Location X Version dummy 1
Vic X Location X Version dummy 2
Vic X Location X Version dummy 3
Vic X Location X Version dummy 4
Vic X Location X Version dummy 5

Notes. Loc = Location; Vic = Victim.

-1.386

9.169

5

0.103

1.078
0.000
0.904
2.711
1.401

1
1
1
1
1

0.299
1.000
0.342
0.100
0.237

APPENDIX E:
NEWS ARTICLE

120

121
This article appeared in the media about this case.
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-washington-case-tuesdayaug18,0,6895496.story

chicagotribune.com
Arrest made in Washington case
By Deborah Flores
Tribute reporter
An arrest has been made in the recent battery of Joseph Washington, a 45-year-old
Chicago resident.
Mr. Washington awoke from a nap to find a man in his home on the morning of August
15th. The man attacked Mr. Washington, then left. Mr. Washington was later taken to
the hospital and treated for a cut on his cheek and a broken rib.
On Monday, police arrested Brian Campbell, 35, a former employee of Jesse
Washington, the victim’s brother. Campbell is facing an aggravated battery charge.
[Participants in the PTP conditions received one of the following additional statements:
According to a police source, the suspect has confessed to the crime.
According to a police source, the suspect has been convicted of a similar crime in the
past.
According to a police source, the suspect did not cooperate during arrest.]
Campbell posted bond and is due in court later this week. Campbell’s attorney, Richard
Bennett, has stated that his client will plead not guilty.
dflores@tribune.com
Copyright © 2009, Chicago Tribune
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Voir Dire Questionnaire
You are now going to serve as a juror on the case you just read about. Before reading the
trial transcript, please complete the following questionnaire, which is part of a process
called ‘voir dire’. Attorneys often use these questionnaires to learn more about potential
jurors.
Gender: (circle one)

Male Female

How old are you? ___________
Year in School (circle one):

Freshman

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Race: (circle one)
African-American/Black
Asian-American
Caucasian
Hispanic/Latino
Other
Prefer not to answer
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes

No

Attorneys also want to know about potential jurors’ views of the legal system. Read each
statement and indicate how much you agree with it.
Note: Questions are not presented here in the same order as they were received by
participants; treatment attitude questions were intermingled with other questions to
decrease participant suspicion.
Questions Received by All Participants:
1. Unfair treatment of underprivileged groups and classes is the chief cause of crime.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

2. Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal
technicalities.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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3. Evidence illegally obtained should be admissible in court if such evidence is the
only way to obtain a conviction.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

4. Search warrants should clearly specify the person or things to be seized.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

5. No one should be convicted of a crime on the basis of circumstantial evidence, no
matter how strong such evidence is.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

6. There is no need in a criminal case for the accused to prove his innocence beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

7. Wiretapping by anyone and for any reason should be completely illegal.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

8. Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the witness stand.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

9. All too often, minority group members do not get fair trials
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

10. Because of the oppression and persecution minority group members suffer, they
deserve leniency and special treatment in the courts.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

11. Citizens need to be protected against excess police power as well as against
criminals.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

12. It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than one innocent one
wrongfully imprisoned.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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13. Accused persons should be required to take lie detector tests.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

14. When there is a “hung” jury in a criminal case, the defendant should always be
free and the indictment dismissed.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

15. A society with true freedom and equality for all would have very little crime.
Strongly Disagree
16.

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

It is moral and ethical for a lawyer to represent a defendant
in a criminal case even when he believes his client is guilty.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

17. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious-looking persons to
determine whether they have been up to something illegal.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

18. The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

19. The freedom of society is endangered as much by overzealous law enforcement as
by the acts of individual criminals.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

20. In the long run, liberty is more important than order.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

21. Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

22. The punishments given to criminals accurately reflect the crimes they have
committed.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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23. The skills of lawyers determine the verdict more than the truth.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

24. Too many criminals are out on parole.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

25. Police brutality is more common than people think.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

26. If a defendant has enough money he or she will be able to buy an acquittal.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

27. As a group, judges are more impartial and fair than people in general.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

28. Juries base their decisions only on the evidence given in court.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

29. Too many criminals are let free because of prison overcrowding.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

30. Court-appointed attorneys and public defenders do as good a job as personally
hired attorneys.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

31. Police will often keep a suspect in custody, even when they don’t have any firm
evidence against him.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

32. Most prosecuting attorneys have a strong sadistic streak.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Confession Questions:
33. When a suspect confesses to the police, he or she does so voluntarily.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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34. Anyone who confesses to a crime should be automatically found guilty and
sentenced.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Prior Record Questions:
35. When determining a person’s guilt or innocence, the existence of a prior arrest
record should not be considered.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

36. If a suspect has committed a crime once, chances are he’ll do it again.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

Resisting Arrest Questions:
37. Any person who resists arrest has committed a crime.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

38. People who run from the police must have something to hide.
Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree
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Trial Transcript
Note: This is an abbreviated transcript, not a complete transcript. You will read statements
by the attorneys and questioning of key witnesses. Some witnesses have been omitted. After
reading this transcript, you will be asked to determine a verdict, and answer some questions
about your reactions to the case.
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THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentleman. We are in open court with counsel and
the defendant, and we have the jury present. The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to
the charge of aggravated battery.
THE COURT: The next part of the trial involves allowing the parties, if they wish to do so, to
make an opening statement. The purpose of an opening statement is to provide you with a
brief outline as to what the parties anticipate the evidence will show during the course of the
trial. We start with the State.
THE COURT: I think we are ready to begin, Mr. Russell.
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.
On the morning of August 15th, Joseph Washington saw his family off to work. Around
10:00 AM, he laid down to take a nap, and awoke shortly after 11:00AM to find a man in his
home. This man proceeded to attack Mr. Washington, by pushing him down, and kicking
him twice in the ribs. This caused Mr. Washington to sustain many injuries, including
bruises, a cut on the cheek, and a broken rib. You will hear from Mr. Washington that he
feared the attacker might intend to kill him. Then you will hear from Mr. Washington that he
identified Brian Campbell as the man who attacked him. You will hear from a neighbor who
recalled seeing the defendant’s car in the area shortly before the attack and another neighbor
who saw the same car in front of the Washington home. You will hear about a wooden case
recovered from the defendant’s home that resembles a case taken from the Washington home
on the day of the attack. Finally, you will hear that the defendant was a former employee of
Mr. Washington’s brother, Jesse Washington, and that the defendant had been recently fired
for poor performance. And you will hear that the defendant told Jesse Washington, “You’ll
be sorry for this” after he was fired.
This is the reason for the attack. It is entirely about revenge. Brian Campbell came into
Joseph Washington’s home and attacked him to get even with his former boss. Perhaps this
was not his original plan when he entered the home. Maybe he wanted to steal something or
ransack the place. But when he found Joseph asleep, his plans changed. He thought, “This is
even better. This will definitely make Jesse Washington sorry.” The defense will try to
convince you that someone else is responsible for brutally attacking Joseph. Other than the
case belonging to Jesse Washington, nothing was taken. The Washingtons have no enemies.
The only person with a grudge, and who threatened Jesse Washington, is in this courtroom
today. We will show you that Brian Campbell is guilty of this brutal crime.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that completes the first opening statement. The next
one is by Mr. Bennett, for the defense.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your honor.
Mr. Russell thinks that because Mr. Washington identified my client in a police lineup, my
client must be guilty. He leaves out the fact that Mr. Washington wears glasses, which he
was not wearing during the attack. Mr. Washington is does not see well without those

131
glasses. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to actually be able to see his attacker.
And yet, Mr. Washington identifies my client. Why? Not because he is guilty, but because
Mr. Washington had met my client and knew what he looked like. Because Jesse
Washington had mentioned that my client was recently fired and may retaliate. Mr.
Washington’s identification of my client means nothing.
We will show that my client has an alibi for the time of the attack. The eyewitness who saw
my client’s car drive by her home is correct. My client was in the area, because his friend
lives in the area. Once again, this identification means nothing. In fact, every piece of
evidence the prosecution will show you can easily be explained. My client is not guilty of
this crime. And that is what we are going to show you.
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THE COURT: We have concluded opening statements. We will now move on to the taking
of evidence. The State is ready to call their first witness.
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Joseph Washington to the stand.
BY MR. RUSSELL: Good morning. Mr. Washington, please state your name and
age for the record.
A. Joseph Washington. 45.
Q. Can you please describe what happened on the morning of August 15th?
A. Yes. I woke up earlier than usual, around 6:00AM. I had some work to do in my garage,
so I started on that. About 7:30 AM, my brother and daughter left for work. I saw them off,
and went back to the garage. About 10, I was feeling pretty sleepy, and I decided to take a
nap. I woke up maybe an hour later, and thought I heard footsteps in my room. I figured it
was my brother, come home early. I looked up and there was a man in my room, looking at
me. He was too tall to be my brother. I stood up, but the man pushed me down on the floor.
It knocked the wind out of me. I tried to get up, but he kicked me in the side. That hurt a lot
more than being pushed down. He kicked me again. I remember lying there, wondering what
would happen next. I was afraid he was going to kill me. He was bigger than me, and I
didn’t know if he had a gun or something. I looked around the room for something to fight
back with, but I looked up and he was gone. I laid there for a while. I’m not sure how long.
I was trying to build up strength to get to the phone. I couldn’t stand, so I crawled to the
phone and called my brother. I told him a man had attacked me. He was tall, maybe 5’11. I
said, “I think it was Brian”. My brother was quiet for a second and then said, “Are you
sure?” And I said, “Yes.”
Q. Why did you call your brother instead of the police?
A. When I reached up for the phone, I felt this sharp pain where he kicked me. I couldn’t
stand up, and reaching was so painful. I wanted to dial quickly, and my brother’s number is
on speed dial, so I only had to hit one button. I guess, looking back, I should have called the
police first, but at the time, I was in such pain, I don’t think I was thinking clearly. My
brother asked if I had called the police, and I said no, so he called.
Q. What happened next?
A. The police arrived. And my brother. I didn’t realize until then that my cheek was cut and
I was bleeding. They took me to the hospital for stitches and x-rays. I found out my rib was
broken, which explains the pain. I told the police what happened, and that Brian Campbell
was my attacker. A couple of days later, they called me in for a lineup.
Q. And that’s when you identified Brian Campbell?
A. Yes.
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Q. How do you think he got into your home?
A: I’m not sure. The police said there were no broken windows or anything, but I know I
didn’t leave any doors open or unlocked. The front door was unlocked when the police
arrived, but I remember locking it.
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you. No further questions.
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you may cross-examine.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your honor.
BY MR. BENNETT: Mr. Washington, would you mind removing your glasses?
A. No, I don’t mind.
Q. How many fingers am I holding up?
A. I don’t know. Three?
Q. May I approach the witness, your honor?
THE COURT: You may.
Q. Okay, this is about five feet away. How about now?
A. I think four.
Q. You’re right. How close was the attacker to you?
A. Maybe a foot or so away.
Q. How difficult was it for you to see my hand?
A. A little difficult, I guess.
Q. You had to squint or strain?
A. A little.
Q. But you’re confident that Mr. Campbell was your attacker?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. I’ve met Brian before. I remember how tall he was and the color of his hair. I recognized
that.
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Q. Thank you. You can put your glasses back on. You said you told your brother you
thought it was Brian. You weren’t sure it was him?
A. I was pretty sure it was Brian who attacked me before that.
Q. Just pretty sure?
A. I was certain it was him. Who else could it be?
Q. How come you didn’t say, “Brian attacked me” first? You described the attacker to your
brother instead before identifying him, right?
A. Yes. I don’t know. I guess I wasn’t thinking too clearly.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, Ms. Washington. No further questions.
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Jesse Washington.
BY MR. RUSSELL: Can you state your name and age for the record?
A. Jesse Washington, 58.
Q. What do you do for a living?
A. I own a body shop.
Q. Did Mr. Campbell ever work for you?
A. Yes, he started in March of last year.
Q. And when did Mr. Campbell stop working for you?
A. When I fired him in late July.
Q. Why did you fire him?
A. He was always goofing off with another employee. Not getting anything done.
Customers were complaining that their cars took too long. It was bad for my business.
Q. Who was that other employee?
A. Ralph Turner. Brian was a good worker until I hired Ralph. I think I hired him in early
July. They spent all of their time goofing around. I talked to them about it. But that didn’t
seem to work, so I fired Ralph because I remembered Brian was fine until Ralph showed up.
But after Ralph was gone, Brian was still not getting work done. He spent a lot of time on his
phone, and he called in maybe three times in a couple of weeks. I talked to him about, but it
didn’t stop. So I fired him too.
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Q. Did Brian get angry?
A. Yes, he punched a wall. And said, “You can’t do this.” I told him sorry, but I’d given
him too many chances. And he said, “You’ll be sorry for this.”
Q. He threatened you?
A. Yes. He was really angry. I asked him what he meant by that, but he just walked away.
Q. Did you worry that he might try to hurt you?
A. A little. He was a big guy. I mean, not just tall, but strong. I mentioned something to my
brother that night. Not to let him in if he comes by. He seemed worried.
Q. You live with your brother?
A. Not today.
Q. Did you in August of last year?
A. Yeah, I moved in early last year, because I doing some major work on my house.
Q. Did Mr. Campbell know where you were living?
A. Yes. We had him over once in May. We had everyone who works for me over for a
barbecue.
Q. And your brother met Brian Campbell then?
A. I think it was then. He’s been by the shop before, so maybe he met him then. He’s talked
to him a couple of times.
Q. The day your brother called, did you suggest Brian Campbell was the attacker?
A. No. Joseph called and said he’d been attacked, and he thought it was Brian. I only asked
if he was sure. And he said, “Yes.” I never said it was Brian. Or made him think it was
Brian.
Q. And when you got home, was anything missing?
A. I have a wooden box on a bookshelf in the hallway. By my brother’s room. It had some
personal things in it. Pictures, letters, a set of keys to my house. I had to change all the
locks.
Q. Why would Brian take that?
MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.
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MR. RUSSELL: I’ll rephrase. Why do you think Joseph’s attacker took that?
A. Maybe he wanted the keys to my place. The letters had my address. Maybe he wanted to
break into my house.
Q. Brian Campbell didn’t know where you lived?
A. No, I wasn’t living there when Brian was working for me. I never had a reason to tell him
where my house was.
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you. Those are all my questions.
BY MR. BENNETT: You’ve never found that missing case?
A. I told the police it wasn’t on the shelf when we were upstairs helping Joseph. Later on, I
looked around and didn’t find it, so I told the police it had been stolen. When they arrested
Brian, and called us down to the station for the lineup, they showed me the case they found in
Brian’s house. It looked like mine, but there was nothing inside.
Q. Was there anything identifiable about the case? Any marks or writing?
A. No writing. I remembered the size and color. And the closure. The case they found was
the same.
Q. And they didn’t find any of the pictures of keys at Mr. Campbell’s place?
A. No, I guess he threw them away.
Q. But it’s possible he never had your case?
A. I guess. It looked exactly the same to me.
Q. Was this case bought from a special store?
A. No, some department store I think. My brother got it for me.
Q. So it was something Mr. Campbell could have bought on his own?
A. Yeah.
Q. You said that Mr. Campbell could have thrown away your pictures and keys. Why would
he keep the case?
A. I don’t know. Maybe he didn’t throw them away. Maybe he hid them.
Q. Somewhere the police didn’t look? Do you know where they searched?
A. His home. His car, I think.
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Q. And found nothing?
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor. The witness has already said the police didn’t find
the objects from the case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. Was your home ever broken into?
A. No.
Q. When he punched the wall, about how hard would you say?
A. I don’t know. Pretty hard I think.
Q. Did he leave a dent or a hole?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever punched something when you felt angry or frustrated?
A. Probably.
MR. BENNETT: No more questions, your honor.
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Laura Phillips.
BY MR. RUSSELL: How do you know Joseph Washington?
A. He’s my neighbor.
Q. Do you know the defendant?
A. No, I don’t.
Q. So, what made you call police that day?
A. I heard Joseph had been attacked at home, and they thought the person drove an old white
Ford truck.
Q. And you saw this truck?
A. Yes. I was outside, in my front yard, gardening. And I saw that car drive by.
Q. Was there anything special that made you remember that car?
A. There’s not a lot of traffic on my street, and it was a quiet morning, and the car was really
loud. Like there was no muffler. It made me look up and watch it drive by.
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Q. What time did you see the defendant’s car?
A. It was around 11:00 in the morning.
MR. RUSSELL: Let me remind the court that shortly after 11:00 AM, the victim was
attacked.
Q. Did it appear that the defendant was driving toward the victim’s home?
MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. Was the defendant driving in the direction of the victim’s home?
A. Yes.
MR. RUSSELL: Nothing further, your honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Bennett, you may cross-examine.
BY MR. BENNETT: Is Mr. Washington’s home the only one in the direction my
client was driving?
A. Well, no. Of course not.
Q. So my client could have been driving any number of places after driving by your house?
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor.
MR. BENNETT: Your honor, I’m not asking the witness if Mr. Campbell was driving
somewhere else. Just that he could have been going anywhere, not necessarily the
Washington home.
THE COURT: I’ll allow it. The witness may answer.
A. There’s a main street that way, so he could have been heading there.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you. Nothing further.
MR. RUSSELL: The State calls Sean Jones.
BY MR. RUSSELL: How do you know Joseph Washington?
A. I live across the street.
Q. What do you remember about the morning of August 15th?
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A. I remember seeing Joseph working in his garage earlier in the day. I was getting into my
car to go to my office. About 11:00 AM, I came back home because I forgot an important
file. As I was turning into my driveway, I noticed a white truck parked in front of Joseph’s
house.
Q. Did this seem strange to you?
A. I wasn’t sure who the car belonged to, but I figured Joseph or someone had company. I
went inside to find the file.
Q. Was the truck there when you came back out?
A. I don’t remember seeing it, no.
Q. When did you come back out?
A. Maybe 10 minutes later. I didn’t really think anything of it until I heard about the attack.
I mentioned to the police that I’d never seen that white truck before that day.
MR. RUSSELL: Thank you. Nothing further.
BY MR. BENNETT: You never heard the car leave?
A. I thought I heard a loud noise, like a loud car or a motorcycle while I was inside my
house. I remember thinking it was strange to hear such a loud car. We live in a pretty quiet
neighborhood.
Q. When did you hear the noise?
A. I think it was a few minutes after I got home. I don’t remember for sure.
Q. The truck you saw. Was it a Ford?
A. It might have been. I didn’t really pay attention.
Q. You mentioned that Joseph or someone maybe had company. What did you mean by
that?
A. Well, the truck wasn’t directly in front of Joseph’s house. It was kind of in between his
house and his next-door neighbor, Mr. Turner’s house.
Q. So you don’t know if the driver of the truck was in the Washington home?
A. No, I don’t.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you. No further questions.
MR. RUSSELL: Your honor, The State rests.
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THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Russell. Mr. Bennett, you may call your first witness.
MR. BENNETT: The defense calls Ralph Taylor to the stand.
BY MR. BENNETT: Was Mr. Campbell with you on the day Joseph Washington
was attacked?
A. Yeah. We were watching TV at my apartment.
Q. You live near Mr. Washington?
A. Just a few blocks.
Q. So, when Mrs. Phillips saw my client driving, he was probably heading to your
apartment?
MR. RUSSELL: Objection, your honor.
MR. BENNETT: I’ll withdraw that question, your honor. About what time did my client
arrive at your apartment?
A. It was a little after 11:00 AM.
Q. And how long did he stay?
A. A couple of hours.
Q. At any time during his stay, did he mention anything to you about Jesse Washington?
A. No. I think he was over being fired. We were looking for new jobs. We talked about
where we’d like to work next. He seemed excited about starting a new job.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you. Nothing further.
BY MR. RUSSELL: You are also a former employee of Jesse Washington?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. And you were laid off shortly before the defendant?
A. Yes.
Q. Did it make you angry at Jesse Washington?
A. Yeah, I guess so. Really, I was more surprised and upset, maybe a little angry.
Q. And if something happened to one of Jesse Washington’s loved ones, you would do what
you could to help, even lie?
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MR. BENNETT: Objection, your honor.
MR. RUSSELL: Withdrawn, your honor.
Q. About how long would it take to get from Mr. Washington’s home to your apartment?
A. I don’t know. 5 minutes maybe.
Q. So it’s possible that Brian Campbell stopped there before coming to your place?
A. I don’t think he would have gone there. Is it possible? I don’t know. Maybe.
Q. Did anyone else see you and Mr. Campbell together?
A. I told my sister he was coming over, but no one else was there while we were watching
TV.
MR. RUSSELL: No further questions.
MR. BENNETT: Redirect, your honor?
THE COURT: Proceed.
BY MR. BENNETT: Mr. Russell is suggesting that you’re lying about my client
being with
you at the time of the attack. Are you lying?
A. Absolutely not. Brian is my friend, but I would never lie about something like this.
MR. BENNETT: Thank you. No further questions, your honor. The defense rests.
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THE COURT: We will now hear closing arguments. Once again, we will begin with the
State.
MR. RUSSELL: The defense would have you believe that this case is entirely about
eyewitness testimony. Specifically Mr. Washington’s testimony that Brian Campbell was his
attacker. But this case is about more than that. There are not one, but three witnesses, and
the other two provide information that shows Mr. Campbell was in the area, and was in front
of Mr. Washington’s house. But this case is still about more than that. Mr. Bennett would
have you believe that Jesse and Joseph Washington were quick to believe Mr. Campbell was
the attacker because of his recent firing. So quick to believe this that they ignored the
possibility that someone else was the attacker. But they believed this because Mr. Campbell
threatened Jesse Washington. He worried Jesse Washington enough for him to tell his
brother. For him to warn that Mr. Campbell might retaliate, and “Don’t let him in if he
comes by.” It seems that they were perfectly warranted in believing that Mr. Campbell was
the attacker. That combined with the eyewitnesses is enough to show Mr. Campbell is guilty.
The defense even admits that Mrs. Phillips saw Brian Campbell’s car drive by shortly before
Joseph Washington was attacked. Ralph Taylor claims that Brian Campbell was with him
watching TV at that time, but Ralph Taylor is also a former employee of Jesse Washington,
who was fired for the same reason as Brian Campbell. Even if Mr. Taylor isn’t lying for
Brian Campbell, the attack took a few minutes. Brian Campbell could have easily driven to
Mr. Taylor’s afterward and still have arrived shortly after 11:00 AM.
Ralph Taylor suggests that Brian Campbell was at peace with his firing. That he had “gotten
over it.” Of course he was at peace. He had just gotten his revenge. Perhaps he had more
planned when he took those keys, but maybe he decided, “This is enough. Time to move
on.” His revenge was at the expense of Joseph Washington’s health, his feeling of safety in
his own home. Brian Campbell’s cruelty cannot go unpunished. Find him guilty of this
crime.
THE COURT: We will now hear the defense’s closing argument.
MR. BENNETT: Joseph Washington was brutally attacked. There is no question about that.
And my client and I hope that the police catch the man who attacked him. But my client was
not that man. We have shown that my client was with another person at the time of the
attack. A witness saw my client’s car in the area, but that’s because my client was driving to
Ralph Taylor’s apartment. We have also shown that Joseph Washington was not wearing his
glasses at the time of the attack, and did not clearly see his attacker’s face. He never heard
the attacker’s voice. And when he told his brother about the attack, he started by describing
the attacker. He said, “A man who was 5’11” attacked me”, and it was only after that Mr.
Washington identified the attacker as my client.
The wooden case found in my client’s home was similar to one owned by Jesse Washington.
But he admitted that the case was plain and unornamented, and could have been purchased
from many stores. The case taken from Joseph’s home contained personal objects, none of
which were found in the case taken from my client’s home. The State has not, and cannot,
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prove that the case in the courtroom today is the one from Joseph’s home. Brian Campbell
was upset about being fired from his job. Anyone would be upset about that. Perhaps he said
something he now regrets. That does not mean he attacked someone.
Mr. Russell thinks that my client’s friend, Ralph Taylor is lying. Unfortunately, there’s
no way I can prove that his friend isn’t lying, except that he says he isn’t. You’ll just
have to take his word for it. But if you disbelieve Mr. Taylor, it’s because you’re taking
Mr. Washington’s word for it. The only evidence the state has that my client attacked
Mr. Washington is that Mr. Washington says so. And Mr. Washington is mistaken.
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THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard all of the evidence. It is my
duty to instruct you on the law.
First, you must determine what facts have been proved from the evidence received in the trial
and not from any other source
[Added in specific instructions: “, such as the media.”]
[Added in strong instructions: “, such as the media. Such outside information can be
unreliable.”]
Second, you must apply the law that I state to you to the facts as you determine them, and in
this way arrive at your verdict, even if you don’t agree with the law.
You must not be influenced by pity for or prejudice against a defendant. You must not be
influenced by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public
feeling.
Statements made by the attorneys are not evidence. Evidence is either direct or
circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial
evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of
other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Circumstantial
evidence should be considered by you together with all the other evidence in the case in
arriving at your verdict.
The defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an
inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, each fact of circumstances on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown.
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. The
State has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable
doubt is defined as the following: it is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating
to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of evidence, leaves the minds of the
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge.
In the crime charged, aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, there must exist severe or
aggravated bodily injury to the victim, involving apparent broken bones, loss of teeth,
possible internal injuries, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.
To sustain the charge of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, the State must prove
the following propositions:
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First: That the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct which caused Joseph
Washington severe or aggravated bodily injury.
Second: That the bodily injury involved apparent broken bones, loss of teeth, possible
internal injuries, severe laceration, or loss of consciousness.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that these propositions have not
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.
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Please provide a verdict and rating of the defendant’s guilt. Answer both questions.

1. As a juror in this case, what would your verdict be (circle one)?
Guilty

Not

Guilty

2. Using the following scale, how likely is it that the defendant is actually guilty
(circle one)?
Definitely
not guilty
1

234567

Neutral

Definitely
guilty
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This study is about decision making in a court case. It is being conducted by Sara M.
Locatelli for a dissertation under the supervision of Linda Heath in the Department of
Psychology at Loyola University of Chicago.
You are being asked to participate because you are eligible for jury service. You must be
at least 18 years of age to participate.
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:
 Read a short news article.
 Complete a questionnaire.
 Read an abbreviated trial transcript.
 Render a verdict.
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those
experienced in everyday life. There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but
the results will be helpful in understanding reactions to trials.
Your results will be completely confidential. Your name will not be attached to any
materials, and only the researcher will have access to the data.
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not
have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any
question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty.
If you have questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Sara Locatelli
at shouse1@luc.edu or the faculty sponsor, Linda Heath, at lheath@luc.edu.
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the
Loyola University Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.
When you are finished reading this form, return it to the experimenter to receive your
study packet. By completing the packet, you are providing consent to participate in the
research.
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You have been participating in a study on jury decision making and the effect of pretrial
publicity. Pretrial publicity is defined as any media coverage of a case not yet in trial.
Past research has shown that pretrial publicity, or PTP, can bias final verdicts in a trial.
Before reading the case, you received a news article. Some of you received only neutral
information about the case, and the rest of you received one piece of biasing information
(that the defendant had confessed, was convicted of a similar crime, or failed to cooperate
with police during arrest). You then completed a measure of legal attitudes, and read the
trial transcript. At the end of the trial, some of you received standard jury instructions,
while the rest of you received more specific instructions, in which you were asked to
ignore pretrial information. It is expected that the negative information from the news
article will only bias verdicts of people with strong legal attitudes. It is also expected that
the instructions to ignore PTP will work on people with moderate legal attitudes, but not
people with strong attitudes.
This research is ongoing, so please do not discuss the study with anyone. If you have any
questions or would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact Sara
Locatelli at shouse1@luc.edu.
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